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To those military officers and men, past and present, who defy prudence and 
serve their country with dash, pomp, and bravado. 
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ABSTRACT 
At midday on June 25, 1876, Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer split 
his Seventh Cavalry Regiment into three elements and attacked an enormous village of 
hostile Indians situated along the Little Bighorn River in modern-day Montana.  Custer 
and his immediate command of five troops, a total of 225 men, did not survive the fight.  
Immediately following the battle, officersReno, Benteen, Brisbin, Terry, 
Gibbonbegan to recreate the history of the campaigns recent events in an effort to 
explain the disaster and clear themselves of responsibility.  Their self-serving omission of 
facts and their convenient remembrance of things that had not happened fully blamed 
Custer for the calamity and heavily influenced future historical assessments of the battle. 
Numerous explanations for the disaster have surfaced over the years.  Driven by 
vain personal motives, Custer allegedly disobeyed General Terrys orders by taking a 
direct route to the Indian village and then rushing his exhausted men into battle without 
waiting for Gibbons support.  He did not conduct a thorough reconnaissance and ignored 
the warnings of his scouts.  He violated a basic maxim of war by splitting his force in the 
face of the enemy, and his midday attack destroyed any hopes for surprise.  Finally, 
Custers actions displayed an overall ineptness at fighting Indians. 
Some of the assessments hold truths, but they must be placed in the context of 
what Custer knew at the time and expected to encounter.  In fact, given his prior 
experiences and information at hand, Custer correctly configured his forces and acted 
appropriately by attacking the hostile village.  His forces, however, were not enough to 
overcome the combination of peculiar circumstances, some of his own creation, that 
opposed them. 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
With the exception of the Battle of Gettysburg, the defeat of Lieutenant Colonel 
George A. Custers Seventh Cavalry at the Little Bighorn has generated more written 
material than any other single fight involving American soldiers.  This attraction does not 
come from the great number of casualties suffered by the regiment, for the battle was not 
the worst outing by the military in its wars against Native Americans, that ignominy 
falling to General Arthur St. Clair and the 832 men slain by the Shawnees and Miamis in 
1791.1  Little Bighorns popularity lies in the controversy concerning what actually 
happened.  Because there were no white eyewitnesses and Indian accounts were often 
contradictory, historians, soldiers, and the media have speculated about actual events over 
the years, their guesswork ranging from the fairly accurate to the ridiculous.   
In large part, the attempt to solve the mysteries of Little Bighorn led to a demand 
to fix blame for the disaster on someone, and Custer emerged as the preferred candidate.  
General Alfred H. Terry and Custers subordinate commanders, Major Marcus A. Reno 
and Captain Frederick W. Benteen, expecting an onslaught of accusations for their roles 
in the failed attack, campaigned to clear their names and, in the process, placed the blame 
on the one man who could not defend himself.  The press, likewise, played a powerful 
role in shaping that version of events.  Custer, an editorial in the Chicago Tribune read 
shortly after the battle, preferred to make a reckless dash and take the consequences, in 
hope of making a personal victory and adding to the glory of another charge, rather than 
wait for a sufficiently powerful force to make the fight successful and share the glory 
with others.2  Even Custers superiors joined in the bashing.  I regard Custers 
                                                          
1 Allan W. Eckert, A Sorrow in Our Heart: The Life of Tecumseh, p. 438. 
2 Quoted in Paul A. Hutton, Custers Changing Image, in Major Problems in the History of the American 
West, p. 467. 
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Massacre, stated President Ulysses S. Grant in an interview with the New York Herald, 
as a sacrifice of troops, brought on by Custer himself, that was wholly unnecessary
wholly unnecessary.3  Not everyone blamed the officer for the disaster, but in light of 
his reputation, personality, political activity, and perceived aspirations, dominant opinion 
condemned the Boy General. 
The indictments against Custer are numerous.  Driven to regain the approval of 
President Grant, he allegedly disobeyed Terrys orders, rushed up the Rosebud River, and 
arrived at the Indian village a day and a half before expected.  He never conducted a full 
reconnaissance of the village and ignored the warnings of his scouts that there were too 
many Indians for the regiment to handle.  With his men and horses fatigued from forced 
marches, he deliberately attacked a numerically superior enemy.  He violated the 
principles of war by scorning surprise and by splintering his forces, losing the needed 
mass for a decisive victory.  An egomaniac with limited experience fighting Indians, 
Custer deluded himself with invincibility and made irrational battlefield decisions, 
resulting in the destruction of his immediate command.  That is the judgment of history
or at least of historians.    
In truth, Custer did want a great victory for himself and his regiment, but he did 
not foolishly throw away his and his mens lives.  He did not disobey Terrys orders, for 
they were nothing more than suggestions.  Terry intended for Custer to find the Indians 
and attack them, and his orders left Custer the discretion to make the decision to attack or 
not.  Custer, furthermore, did not attack earlier than planned because Terry had not 
specified a time for a combined attack with Colonel John Gibbons soldiers in support.  
                                                          
 
3 Quoted in Robert M. Utley, Custer and the Great Controversy: The Origin and Development of a Legend, 
p. 44. 
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The much-debated link-up date of June 26 was only an approximation of when Terry and 
Gibbons column would reach the mouth of the Little Bighorn and Terrys written orders 
to Custer did not even mention it.   
Custers scouts did report a large concentration of Indians situated on the lower 
Little Bighorn, and he was guilty of not conducting a thorough reconnaissance before his 
attack, but he had every intention to do so.  His plan to view the objective and attack on 
the 26th changed, however, as he received reports on the morning of the 25th that hostiles 
had discovered the regiment.  Fearing that the enemy would scatter, Custer pushed his 
men forward in pursuit.  Custer did not know the true size or exact location of the Indian 
camp nor was he truly concerned.  He shared a belief with most Army officers on the 
Plains, founded in previous experiences, that the hardest part of fighting Indians was not 
defeating them, but catching them.  Hence, his approach toward the village was a forced 
reconnaissance, a difficult mission requiring situational development, decisions, and 
coordination while on the move.   
Custers planned three-pronged attack, with the bulk of his combat strength 
directly under his own control, would allow him to hit the village from multiple 
directions and prevent a mass enemy escape.  This scheme of maneuver had worked eight 
years earlier on the Washita River against a village of Southern Cheyennes, Kiowas, 
Apaches, Arapahos, and Comanches that we now know was at least as large as the 
encampment on the Little Bighorn.   
The driving component of Custers attack was his belief that he had lost the 
element of surprise, which would seem a direct violation of one of the basic principles of 
war.  However, he did not believe he was attacking a village in a defensive posture, but 
one on the run.  Ironically, he did achieve surprise as all Indian accounts indicate that 
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they were not expecting an attack, and the appearance of Renos battalion caught many of 
the Indians in the midst of their daily activities.  Likewise, Indian accounts dispel theories 
that they intricately planned an attack against Custer.  
Given what he knew at the time and what he had experienced in prior 
engagements, Custers actions and tactics were sound, and he does not deserve the sole 
blame for the disaster.  His attack under normal circumstances likely would have worked, 
but the situation on the Little Bighorn was anything but normal.  On that day in 1876, the 
Sioux and Cheyenne were strong in numbers, confident after repelling General George 
Crooks June 17 attack along the Rosebud, well-armed, motivated by the governments 
actions to take the Black Hills, and led by extraordinary chiefs.  They were not going to 
run as they had so often done before, and here lay Custers misjudgment and demise.  His 
tactics, which had proven successful before, represented a blatant underestimation of the 
Indians resolve and fighting ability, something of which not only Custer but the majority 
of Army officers on the Plains were guilty.  
For Custer, prior experience and lessons learned did not provide a basis for 
Seventh Cavalry victory but, instead, set the stage for disaster. 
 
 5 
CHAPTER 1 
PRELIMINARIES OF WAR 
In the decade prior to the Great Sioux War of 1876-77, the Indian policy of the 
United States vacillated between peaceful pacification and overt hostility.  The Army was 
caught in the middle, criticized by the Eastern peace zealots when its forces destroyed a 
hostile Indian village and denounced by Western settlers when its leaders tried less 
forceful means to establish peace.  The events of this period reflected the governments 
indecisiveness about how best to protect the frontier population while humanely 
addressing Indian issues.  These mixed agendas eventually resulted in the large-scale 
gathering of the determined, angry, and well-armed Indian force that Lieutenant Colonel 
George A. Custer encountered on the Little Bighorn.  Custer, for his part, in the years 
preceding the fateful clash in June 1876, developed and honed the opinions, perceptions, 
tactics, and decision-making skills that prompted and justified his actions at the Little 
Bighorn. 
When the Civil War ended, the United States revived its focus on continental 
expansion, reducing the gap between the eastern states and western territories by 
conquering the Great Plains.  In the spring of 1866, the progress of the Kansas Pacific, 
Union Pacific, and Central Pacific railroads signaled the new era of westward settlement.  
The Armys mission in the unfolding story of Manifest Destiny was to protect the 
railroad builders from marauding Indians, but not to carry out a full campaign against the 
Plains tribes.1  The government, controlled by the Radical Republicans, had chosen a 
more humanitarian approach to solving the Indian question: the Peace Policy.  This 
                                                          
1 Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, pp. 2-3. 
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strategy established negotiating commissions that offered monetary annuities and 
designated reservations in return for the safe construction of railroads and forts and 
passage through the Indians territories.  The ultimate goal of the Peace Policy was the 
assimilation of the Indians into white society.  Once the Indians were on the reservations, 
agents would provide instruction in farming and animal husbandry and, through 
schooling and religious teachings, turn the Indians into peaceful, law-abiding citizens.2   
The Peace Policy worked to an extent, but the Teton Sioux, consisting of the 
Hunkpapa, Brulé, Oglalla, Two Kettle, Miniconjou, San Arcs, and Blackfeet bands, and 
their allies the Northern Cheyenne and Northern Arapaho did not accept the offerings.3  
Residing in an area commonly referred to as the Powder River country, a vast domain 
ranging from the Missouri River in the east to the Bighorn Mountains in the west and 
from Platte River in the south to the Canadian border in the north, these tribes did not 
stand in the way of any current railroad expansion nor were they disrupting the travel of 
white miners along the Bozeman Trail, which ran through their territory and into 
Montana.4  Army leaders, however, saw these hostiles as an inevitable threat to westward 
expansion and were convinced that eventually they would have to use force to subdue 
them.   
In the spring of 1866, the Army had more than half of its 55,000 soldiers stationed 
in the former Confederate states and was not fully prepared for a conflict with the Sioux.5  
Recognizing this, General William Tecumseh Sherman, the commander of the 
Department of the Mississippi, a territory that encompassed the Plains, adopted a plan to 
                                                          
2 George E. Hyde, Red Clouds Folk: A History of the Oglala Sioux Indians, pp. 134-35. 
3 Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West, pp. 8-9. 
4 Stephen E. Ambrose, Crazy Horse and Custer: The Parallel Lives of Two American Warriors, p. 227. 
5 Utley, Frontier Regulars, 12. 
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first acquire the Siouxs consent for white usage of the Bozeman Trail and then to build a 
series of forts along the travel route.  With the forts in position, he could reorganize the 
Army, raise and train new cavalry regiments, and attack the Sioux the next year.  
Negotiations for the trail went well as a number of friendly Indians agreed to allow the 
whites free passage in return for yearly annuities, but Shermans negotiators purposely 
neglected to mention the building of forts.  When the Oglalla chiefs Red Cloud and Crazy 
Horse discovered the Armys true intentions, they took to the warpath, throwing the yet 
prepared military into a fight dubbed Red Clouds War.6  
The significant relationship between Red Clouds War and the Great Sioux War 
of the following decade is the agreement that ended the first contestthe Treaty of Fort 
Laramie in 1868.  The Army poorly managed this conflict and suffered staggering defeats 
at times.  In the midst of the fighting, moreover, problems sprang up on the Central Plains 
where raiding bands of Southern Cheyenne, Arapaho, and Kiowa interrupted the 
construction of the Kansas Pacific railroad.  With a primary mission of protecting the 
railroad builders, the Army could not continue to waste money or lives in a losing effort 
against the Sioux while other hostiles ravaged the Kansas countryside.  Realizing that the 
frontier Army was too small and too poorly-equipped to wage a full-scale war on 
multiple fronts, Sherman opted to target one group of Indians at a time.  To do this, he 
reverted to the Peace Policy and managed to appease the Sioux, bringing the conflict to 
an end for the time being.  The Army would have to abandon its forts on the Bozeman 
Trail, but Sherman would now have the much-needed manpower to quell the problem on 
the Central Plains.7   
                                                          
6 Ambrose, Crazy Horse and Custer, pp. 228-29. 
7 Ibid., p. 306. 
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In April 1868, Red Cloud and representatives from the other Teton Sioux bands 
negotiated the Fort Laramie Treaty, giving them present-day South Dakota west of the 
Missouri River as the Great Sioux Reservation and hunting rights to portions of the 
Powder River country and its massive buffalo herd.  To control the reservation, the 
government established two agencies in northwest Nebraska, the Red Cloud and Spotted 
Tail, the latter named for a dominant Brulé chief.  At the time of the treaty, the total 
population of Sioux in the Powder River area numbered between 10,000 and 15,000.  Of 
these at least 5,000 immediately migrated to the agencies and within three years another 
5,000 took up reservation life, leaving an estimated contingent of 3,000 wild Sioux 
outside the reservation boundaries.8  This latter group never signed the treaty nor chose to 
abide by its regulations. 
The treaty appeared to be an all-out victory for the Sioux and their allies; 
however, several of its articles soon created friction between the Indians and the United 
States.  First, the agreement took on a false appearance of permanence because neither 
side could make changes to the treaty unless executed and signed by three-fourths of all 
the adult male Indiansa nearly impossible stipulation to achieve.  Secondly, the 
Siouxs designated hunting area, a stretch of land lying south of the Yellowstone River 
but encompassing the eastern flank of the Bighorn Mountains and the rivers named after 
them, was simply just that.  The government dubbed it unceded, meaning that the 
Sioux and their allies could hunt there as long as the buffalo existed but could not 
occupy permanently the territory outside the reservation.  Lastly, while the Army 
agreed to abandon its forts, close the Bozeman Trail, and keep whites from entering or 
                                                          
 
8 Hyde, Red Clouds Folk, p. 253. 
9 
 
settling inside the reservation, the government gained authorization to construct railroads 
through and around the reservation for a cost of whatever amount of damage may be 
assessed by three disinterested commissioners.9  Purposeful violations of these clauses 
eventually led to the outbreak of war.  
The fight on the Central Plains went well for the Army and there Custer 
experienced his first major contact with Indians at the Battle of the Washita in November 
1868.  From this single fight emerged the preferred tactic for attacking Indian villages: a 
coordinated cavalry charge from multiple directions executed at dawn against an 
unsuspecting enemy.  Other officers, such as Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie in his battle 
against the Kiowa and Cheyenne in Palo Duro Canyon in September 1874, would later 
emulate the actions of the Seventh Cavalrys commander with great success.10  Although 
the battle boosted the reputation of Custer and his regiment, it also influenced the disaster 
at the Little Bighorn.  
Meanwhile, the Indians who had not signed the Fort Laramie Treaty, some 3,000 
Sioux and 400 Northern Cheyenne, remained in the Powder River country, the unceded 
territory.  The various bands followed their own leaders, among them Two Moon, Four 
Horns, Gall, Crow King, Lame Deer, Black Eagle, and Crazy Horse.  But, one chief 
dominated the others: the Hunkpapa leader Sitting Bull.  Among Indians and whites 
alike, the occupants of the unceded territory became known as Sitting Bulls 
people.11   
                                                          
9 Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Sioux, April 29, 1868, p. 5. 
10 Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee, p. 215. 
11 Robert M. Utley, Cavalier in Buckskin: George Armstrong Custer and the Western Military Frontier, p. 
113. 
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These nontreaty Indians roamed at will throughout the region, but they often 
frequented the agencies to visit relatives in the fall and winter, attaching themselves to 
the reservation long enough to draw rations.  That procedure often gave Indian agents and 
the government the impression that the Peace Policy was working, yet as soon as the 
weather turned, the nontreaties left for the Powder River, often joined by others 
disgruntled with reservation life.  In addition to that summer migration, agents also 
witnessed a great exodus of treaty Indians as they routinely joined their kinsmen in the 
wilds of Montana and Wyoming for hunting and celebrating, returning in the latter 
portion of the season.  The number of Indians in the unceded territory, thus, rose in the 
summer and decreased in the winter, yet there always remained a contingent of hostile 
Sioux in the Powder River country, a direct violation of the Fort Laramie Treaty.12 
Since they had not signed the treaty, Sitting Bulls bands did not confine 
themselves to the designated hunting area, often residing outside of it and in the 
Yellowstone Basin, and they saw no need to respect the railroads.  In 1871 and 1872, as 
the first surveyors for the Northern Pacific railroad and their soldier escorts moved along 
the Yellowstone, they repeatedly encountered hostile Sioux war parties, which forced 
them to abandon their work.  Responsibility for the safe construction of the Northern 
Pacific lay with the Armys Department of Dakota, yet the command did not have 
enough cavalry to deal forcefully with the Indian resistance.  To counter this manpower 
shortage, General Philip H. Sheridan, now in overall command of the region, assigned 
Custer and his Seventh Cavalry Regiment to the department in the summer of 1873 to 
protect the railroad survey west of the Missouri River and into Montana.13   
                                                          
12 Hyde, Red Clouds Folk, pp. 252-53. 
13 Utley, Cavalier in Buckskin, p. 115. 
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On June 20, 1873, the Yellowstone Expedition, commanded by Colonel David S. 
Stanley and accompanied by Custer and over 1,500 men, departed from Fort Rice, 
Dakota Territory.  In August, while moving along the Yellowstone Valley, Custer and his 
troops fought the hostiles in a number of skirmishes.  That September, upon completion 
of the survey mission, the expedition disbanded.14  Custer and his men had performed 
brilliantly against the Sioux and Cheyenne, yet they were unable to defeat them 
decisively.  Sitting Bulls village, numbering over 800 fighting men, had fled after 
putting up a short, intense fight.  Custer, in his official report, confidently noted that, as 
his troopers advanced to charge, the Indians had exhibited unmistakable signs of 
commotion, and their resistance became more feeble, until finally satisfied of the earnest 
of our attack they turned their ponies heads and began disorderly flight.  Custers 
element pursued the warriors for nine miles but never caught them.15  
 By autumn of that year, hostile activity had increased in the Northern Plains.  
Large numbers of Sitting Bulls bands arrived at the agencies in autumn, just after the 
fight with Custer, complaining of the presence of surveyors and troops in their hunting 
grounds.  Their complaints stirred the reservation Sioux, creating potential trouble for the 
white settlements in Nebraska and Wyoming.  Later, in February 1874, a member of the 
band murdered an agency clerk, and others killed two soldiers outside Fort Laramie.  
Throughout the next two months, hostilities escalated as war parties repeatedly struck 
isolated ranches, killing settlers and running off livestock.16  General Sheridan sent troops 
to reinforce the agencies, but he insisted that the Army needed a more strategically 
                                                          
14 Ibid., pp. 117-23. 
15 Custers battle report, in Elizabeth B. Custer, Boots and Saddles or, Life in Dakota with General 
Custer, p. 246. 
16 Hyde, Red Clouds Folk, pp. 207-14. 
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located post to discourage the violence.  By holding an interior point in the heart of the 
Indian country, he wrote to Sherman, we could threaten the villages and the stock of 
the Indians, if they made raids on our settlements.17   
For the site, Sheridan chose the Black Hills, a land held sacred by the Sioux, but 
he needed reconnaissance information before reaching a final decision.  Receiving 
approval from President Ulysses S. Grant and General Sherman, he assigned Custer and 
his regiment the task of exploring the region.  Although Sheridan initially wanted to send 
a force from Fort Laramie, which lay only 100 miles southwest of the Black Hills, he 
concluded that Custers route from Fort Lincoln, although three times as far, would less 
likely disturb the Indians on the Sioux reservation.18  The official objective of the ensuing 
Black Hills Expedition was to find a location to build a fort.  Debate immediately 
surfaced in the government over the placement of the fort, the movement of troops 
without Indian consent, and the legality of the whole undertaking.  The Treaty of 1868, 
however, allowed for the construction of new facilities if they would help government 
officials in the conduct of their duties.19  But that was not the problem. 
The real problem, in any case, stemmed from the unofficial reason for the 
expedition: gold.  Since the time that trapper and explorer Jim Bridger had reported 
finding gold in the Black Hills in 1859, a rumor of the areas vast mineral deposits had 
circulated throughout the country.  By the early 1870s, the talk had turned to reality as on 
more than one occasion Indians brought in nuggets or grains of gold for trading, and then, 
under the influence of whiskey, revealed the location of their findings.20  Public demand 
                                                          
17Quoted in Utley, Cavalier in Buckskin, p. 133. 
18 Ibid., p. 133. 
19 Ambrose, Crazy Horse and Custer, p. 375. 
20 Frazier and Robert Hunt, I Fought with Custer: The Story of Sergeant Windolph, p. 117. 
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for an open exploration of the mountains grew even greater as the country reeled under 
the impact of the Panic of 1873.  The Bismarck Tribune voiced general sentiment.  As 
the Christian looks forward with hope and faith to that land of pure delight, it declared, 
so the miner looks forward to the Black Hills, a region of fabulous wealth, where the 
rills repose on beds of gold and the rocks are studded with precious metals.21  The 
government, unable to explain the reasons for the depression, could not ignore public 
opinion, so it undertook to check the validity of the claims.  If great deposits of gold were 
present in the region, the government might be able to purchase the land from the Sioux 
and, with minimal effort, end the economic slump.22 
Amid vast publicity, on July 2,1874, the Black Hills Expedition under Custer 
marched out of Fort Lincoln with ten cavalry troops, two infantry companies, three 
Gatling guns, and a three-inch Rodman cannon.  Also along were engineers, three 
journalists, botanists, topographers, and other specialists to map the country and find a 
suitable spot for the fort.  As part of the unofficial reason for the expedition, a two-man 
geological team accompanied them.  In view of the clamor about gold in the Black 
Hills, wrote historian Robert Utley, no military expedition could have entered the hills 
for any purpose without also looking for gold.23    
The expedition expected to have to fight its way into the Black Hills and was 
prepared to do so.  After one sighting of hostiles just before entering the Black Hills, 
however, there were no further immediate signs of Indians.  By the end of the month, 
Custers small army had reached its destination, and while camped near French Creek, 
                                                          
 
21 Quoted in Utley, Cavalier in Buckskin, p. 134. 
22 Ambrose, Crazy Horse and Custer, pp. 372-73. 
23 Utley, Cavalier in Buckskin, p. 135.   
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the prospectors unearthed the long-sought ore.  We have discovered gold without a 
doubt, he wrote to his wife Libbie on August 2, and probably other valuable metals.24  
Custer also sent his first official report with one of his white scouts, Lonesome Charley 
Reynolds, to Fort Laramie to inform the outside world of the findings.  In the report, 
Custer wrote that he had in front of him forty or fifty small particles of pure gold, in size 
averaging that of a small pin-head and most of it obtained today from one pan-full of 
earth.  In a widely circulated passage, he penned that the inexperienced miners had 
found gold among the roots of the grass.25  He went on, in further accounts, to stress 
the beauty of the area, its fertile grasses, abundance of game, and the scarcity of 
Indians.26  As the expedition departed the Black Hills on August 14, Custers penmanship 
had promoted the opening of the area as much as the actual discovery of gold, and he 
would share a responsibility for the coming war.   
Word of the territorys potential drove the public to a frenzy, and, although the 
Interior Department proclaimed the Black Hills closed to whites because of the Treaty of 
1868 and both President Grant and General Sherman issued directives for the Army to 
halt trespassers, miners still rushed into the area.  Prompted by the outcry for a complete 
opening of the Black Hills, another expedition, headed by a mining engineer from the 
New York School of Mines and escorted by Colonel Richard I. Dodge, ventured into the 
area to confirm Custers reports and produced an even more favorable assessment.27  The 
Army now could not stop the flood of whites into the Sioux lands.  They were conveyed 
out of the country, wrote historian Judson E. Walker, by military escort, imprisoned in 
                                                          
24 Custer, Boots and Saddles, p. 264. 
25 Custers official report, in Hunt, I Fought with Custer, pp. 118-19. 
26 Custer, Boots and Saddles, pp. 261-66. 
27 Stewart, Custers Luck, p. 67. 
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military posts, their property destroyed, and themselves turned over to civil authority, to 
be punished for disobedience of the orders of the federal Government.  But all to no avail.  
Popular sympathy in the west was with them.28  
 Realizing the political and physical impracticability of keeping its own citizens 
out of the Black Hills, the United States government in 1875 began pressuring the Sioux 
to sell the territory.  The Army, using stricter measures, could have kept a greater portion 
of the miners out, but that would have resulted in a political upheaval for the Grant 
Administration, a presidency already facing problems.  The decision to attempt a 
purchase was logical.29  In the spring of 1875, Grant summoned Red Cloud, Spotted Tail, 
and representative chiefs from all of the other bands to Washington in an attempt to gain 
their approval for the sale.  The Sioux chiefs immediately refused, insisting that they had 
to consult with their people before making such an important decision.  Frustrated but 
hopeful, the government arranged a special commission to meet with all of the Sioux in 
the autumn to discuss the matter.30  
In September of that year, the Allison Commission, named for its chairman 
Senator W.B. Allison, met with almost 15,000 Indians at a site eight miles east of the Red 
Cloud Agency.  The Oglallas, Miniconjous, Brulés, Two Kettles, San Arcs, Yanktons, 
Hunkpapas, Blackfeet, Santees, Arapahos, and Northern Cheyennes sent representatives; 
however, Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull refused to send any delegates from their 
respective bands to the council.31 
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Arguments among the Indians delayed the meeting for almost two weeks as 
distinct groups formed with differing opinions on how best to handle the proposal.  The 
largest faction, led by Red Cloud and Spotted Tail, considered the Black Hills already 
lost and wanted the greatest amount of money for them, but others would not agree to 
depart with the sacred land.  Because of incessant quarreling, the commissioners soon 
began to lose hope that they could induce the required three-fourths of the tribe to sign 
over the Black Hills.32   
 The Indians could not, and would not, agree to anything.  Several times the 
meetings turned into riots with the Siouxs internal police having to restrain some of the 
young men from killing the government representatives.  Finally, on September 23, the 
council ended abruptly as an armed Little Big Man, an Oglalla associate of Crazy Horse, 
stormed into the negotiation tent and threatened in a loud voice to kill the white men who 
were trying to steal his land.  Indian soldiers promptly ushered him out, but the damage 
was done.  Other warriors, caught up in the spirit, dashed their horses in front of the 
government officials, brandishing rifles and shouting the Sioux war cry, Hoka-hey!  
The meeting ended without bloodshed, but the belligerent demonstration convinced the 
members of the commission that they did not ever gain want to deal with such a large 
contingent of Sioux.  They sought one final approach: a conference with only the chiefs 
present.33   
Three days later, the commission summoned twenty of the Indian leaders to the 
Red Cloud Agency, but the talks accomplished little as each chief stated his own price 
and would not agree to anything less.  Their prices were staggering.  Red Cloud 
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demanded not only that the government feed and clothe the Sioux for seven generations 
to come, but make a monetary payment of $600 million as well.  The commission 
weakly proposed $400,000 a year for mining rights in the Black Hills with the right to 
cancel with two years notice or $6 million for the outright purchase.  The chiefs refused, 
and the negotiations ended for good.34   
 The government was in an embarrassing situation.  The Treaty of 1868 explicitly 
excluded all whites from the Sioux lands and pledged that the government would use its 
military to stop white invaders.  Seemingly, the Grant Administration faced two 
alternatives: employ vigorous force to keep non-Indians out of the Black Hills or find a 
justified reason for seizing the mineral-rich territory.  The government did not choose 
either.  Washington fully intended to have the Black Hills, but it would not blatantly 
break its treaty with the Sioux.35 
On November 3, 1875, President Grant discussed the situation with his cabinet 
and General Sheridan.  Two decisions emerged from the meeting.  The first was that the 
order barring miners from the Black Hills would remain in effect, but that the Army 
would make no moves to stop the trespassers.  The second was that the hostiles of Sitting 
Bulls bands stood in the way of progress and must settle on the reservation.36  They had 
obstructed the sale of the Black Hills, raided the periphery of the unceded territory, 
resisted the advancement of the Northern Pacific railroad, disrupted the management of 
the reservations, and harassed friendly tribes.37    
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The decision not to seal off the Black Hills meant that the area would soon fill 
with whites.  Indeed, within four months, eleven thousand whites were inhabiting the 
town of Custer, and more than fifteen thousand were in the Black Hills.  There were more 
whites in the area than Indians on the reservation.38  Implementing the second decision 
would be more difficult.  Government authorities needed a pretext to force the hostiles 
from the unceded territory in Wyoming and Montana onto the reservation.  Searching 
for valid reasons, they concluded that, although the discovery of gold in the Black Hills 
had not currently caused an increase in Indian hostilities, the presence of Sitting Bulls 
free-ranging bands in the adjacent region would inevitability threaten the safety of 
American citizens and, furthermore, these hostiles were in violation of the Treaty of 
1868.  The complexity of the Black Hills issues merely created an excuse to end the 
Indian problem on the Northern Plains and close the uncertain and poorly observed 
truce that had existed since 1868.39  Military force would likely come into play.  As the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs later reported in March 1876, it will probably be 
necessary to compel the northern non-treaty Sioux, and such outlaws from the several 
agencies as have attached themselves to these same hostiles, to cease marauding and 
settle down, as other Sioux have done.40 
 On December 6, 1875, Grant issued an order for all Indians in the unceded 
territory to move onto the reservation and report to an agency before the end of January.  
If they did not make the move within the fifty-plus days, the government would consider 
them hostile and enemies of the United States.  The order was a declaration of war, 
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although Grant and his staff did not really think that the Sioux would resist.  They 
expected them, once threatened by the military, to come in like lambs.41 
 The ultimatum reached the agencies just before Christmas, and half-breeds and 
other reliable Indians immediately embarked on the mission to relay the word to Sitting 
Bulls camps.  The messengers set out in severe weather, which slowed their travel and 
hampered their ability to find the winter camps.  Some came back without locating the 
hostiles, and several returned after the ultimatum date of January 31.  Every band, 
however, received word of the order, but none reported to any agencies.42  On February 1 
Secretary of the Interior Zachariah Chandler notified Secretary of War William W. 
Belknap that Sitting Bull still refuses to comply with the directives of the 
Commissioner, the said Indians are hereby turned over to the War Department for such 
actions as you deem proper.  Two days later, Belknap informed Chandler that the Army 
had received orders to take immediate measures to compel these Indians to remain upon 
their reservation."43  The United States had declared war. 
The Indian Office placed the number of Sioux outside the agencies at 
approximately 3,000.  This was probably accurate at the time, but as was the custom, 
many bands flocked to the agencies in the winter months for food and blankets, 
increasing enrollment and giving a false picture of Peace Policy success.  The coming 
spring and summer, however, would see the largest departure of Indians from the Great 
Sioux Reservation since its creation.44 
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 With military action approved, Sheridan dispatched orders to his commanders 
authorizing them to commence a campaign against Sitting Bulls bands on February 7, 
1876.  Unless they are caught before early spring, he wrote Secretary of Interior 
Chandler, they can not be caught at all.45  His campaign plan involved a three-pronged 
attack.  A Montana column under Colonel John Gibbon, would consist of infantry and 
cavalry and move east from Fort Ellis, near present-day Bozeman, Montana, and along 
the Yellowstone River.  A second, the Dakota column, originally headed by Custer but 
later placed under General Alfred H. Terry, would march west from Fort Abraham 
Lincoln near Bismarck, North Dakota, paralleling the Yellowstone.  General George 
Crook would lead a third, the Wyoming column, northward from Fort Fetterman and into 
the Powder River country.  The three columns would converge at a common center 
around the Bighorn or Little Bighorn Rivers.46 
 Severe weather, as well as Custers untimely recall to Washington for testimony 
in the Belknap Impeachment, postponed deployment of the Dakota column.  Terry set a 
delayed departure date of April 6, but circumstances and weather again postponed the 
march.47  Crook, on the other hand, commenced his movement with a combined force of 
800 infantry and cavalry along the Bozeman Trail during a blizzard on March 1.  Two 
weeks later, on the 16th, his scouts discovered a village of Oglalla Sioux (possibly Crazy 
Horses) and Cheyenne along the Powder River.  Crook sent Colonel Joseph J. Reynolds 
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and six troops of cavalry into the camp the following morning.  Striking from multiple 
directions, Reynolds men quickly took the village, but the Indians rallied and 
counterattacked, forcing the command to abandon its position in haste and allowing the 
Indians to recapture the majority of their pony herd and supplies.  Crook, infuriated by 
Reynolds failure to hold the village, returned wearily to Fort Fetterman to refit his unit.  
He would later have Reynolds court-martialed for lack of aggressiveness and 
indecisiveness.48 
While Terry waited for the weather to improve and for Custers return from 
Washington, he attempted to carry out his portion of the winter campaign by directing 
Gibbon to move down the Yellowstone River from his western position in Montana.  On 
April 3, Gibbons column of nearly 500 men set out.  For over a month, the column had 
no contact with the hostiles, continuously sending scouting parties along the river and its 
tributaries, but finally on May 16, Lieutenant James H. Bradley and his Crow scouts 
sighted a large village along the confluence of the Yellowstone and Tongue Rivers.49  
The column attempted to cross the river to execute an attack, but after several horses 
drowned, Gibbon abandoned the effort.50   
At last on May 17, the Dakota column left Fort Lincoln.  Terry, the overall 
commander, led about 1,000 men, with Custers Seventh Cavalry accounting for 750.  
Custer broke his command into two wings of three troop battalions, the right wing under 
Major Marcus A. Reno and the left under Captain Frederick W. Benteen.  To their front, 
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well in advance, rode Lieutenant Charles A Varnum and thirty-nine Arikara scouts.51  
They were a proud and confident lot.  Oh, it was a fine regiment, right enough, recalled 
Private Charles Windolph of Troop H.  And there wasnt a man in it who didnt believe 
it was the greatest cavalry outfit in the entire United States Army.52 
While Custer and Terry marched, Gibbons column continued to encounter Indian 
sign.  On several occasions, the hostiles attacked the units hunting parties, and on May 
23, a group confronted and killed two soldiers and a civilian teamster.53  Four days later, 
Bradley and his scouts located the large village, but now it stood on the Rosebud, only 
eighteen miles from Gibbons position.  The exact reasons for Gibbons failure to attack 
are unknown.  The following day, nonetheless, he received orders from Terry to march 
along the north side of the Yellowstone toward the mouth of Glendive Creek, where the 
general, unaware of Gibbons findings, believed the Indians to be.  The colonel was then 
to cross the river and link-up with the Dakota column.  Instead of reporting back that he 
had located a large village, Gibbon simply obeyed orders.54  
Gibbon met Terry aboard the steamboat Far West on June 9.  By that time, 
Custer, who was scouting the Little Missouri, had yet to locate any Indians, Crook had 
not sent word of any contact, and only Bradley had seen a village.  With that insight, 
Terry directed Gibbon to retrace his steps and establish a position at the mouth of the 
Rosebud.55  Following the meeting, Terry pondered his next move.  He suspected that the 
Sioux camp now lay somewhere at the base of the Bighorn Mountains, but wanted to 
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make certain that it had not moved back to the east.  Gibbons delayed reports and the 
fact that the Sioux had moved twice since Bradleys scouts had first sighted them made 
further reconnaissance urgent.  Terry, therefore, dispatched an order for Major Reno to 
scout down the Powder and up the Tongue River, while Custer and Benteen would move 
on the south side of the Yellowstone.  The entire regiment would eventually reunite at the 
mouth of the Tongue.  If the reconnaissance did not find any Indians, Terry would have 
Custer and Gibbon converge on the Rosebud, and if the Sioux were there as Gibbon had 
reported, the two forces would have them trapped.  
 By June 19, Custer had completed his portion of the scout and was waiting at the 
mouth of the Tongue for word from Reno.  That same day the major sent a message to 
Terry that he had scouted not only the Powder and Tongue, but had also crossed the 
Rosebud.  The next day Reno rode into Custers camp, and the entire regiment marched 
back to Terrys base camp, arriving on June 21.  To an agitated Terry, Reno gave the full 
report of his reconnaissance.  He had located an Indian trail, found a month-old camp of 
about 400 lodges on the Tongue, and then discovered a more recently abandoned site of 
the same village on the Rosebud.  This confirmed Bradleys scouting reports, but it also 
changed Terrys plan because the Indians were no longer on the Rosebud.56   Terrys 
anger with Reno arose from a concern that the major, who had gone beyond his orders by 
crossing the Rosebud during his mission, could have jeopardized the entire operation.  
Custer, too, was furious at Reno for his failure to pursue the hostiles.  I fear their failure 
to follow up the Indians has imperiled our plans by giving the village an intimation of our 
presence, Custer wrote to Libbie on the 21st.  Think of the valuable time lost!57  His 
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opinion was that Reno should have continued on the trail and attacked.  Few officers, 
he told a newspaper correspondent that same day, have ever had so fine an opportunity 
to make a successful and telling strike, and few have ever so completely failed to improve 
their opportunity.58  Custer wanted victory for the Seventh Cavalry and obviously was 
convinced even then that Renos small force could have won. 
 Unbeknownst to the leaders of the Dakota or Montana columns, Crook, in fact, 
had fought those same Indians in the Battle of the Rosebud.  The generals soldiers had 
taken the field again on May 29 and halted at the Rosebud on the June 16.  While the 
soldiers camped, Sioux scouts discovered the column, and the next morning as many as 
700 warriors, representing all of the Teton Sioux bands and Northern Cheyenne, attacked.  
Colonel Anson Mills, a participant in the battle, recalled that the Indians had boldly 
charged into the soldiers, knocking them from their horses with lances and knifes, 
dismounting and killing them, cutting off the arms of some at the elbow in the middle of 
the fight and carrying them away.59  Throughout the fight, the Indians displayed 
surprising spirit, abandoning their old techniques of hovering at a safe distance and taking 
little risk.  They were in front, rear, flanks, and on every hilltop, far and near, one 
soldier later reported.  I had been in several Indian battles, but never saw so many 
Indians at one time before, . . . or so brave.60  The fight forced Crook to abandon his 
campaign and return to the base camp on Goose Creek.  He was short on supplies, had 
suffered twenty-eight dead and over fifty wounded, and believed that his command was 
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not large enough to pursue such an immense Indian force.61  Terry and Custer would 
never receive word of the Indians numbers or energetic fighting ability. 
 On the evening of June 21, without knowledge of the Indians exact whereabouts 
or strength, Terry made a fateful decision.  He would send Custer forward as a swift-
moving strike force up the Rosebud to find the hostiles and drive them against Gibbons 
blocking force on the Yellowstone.  This reflected the uncertainty about the Indians 
location for they could still be on the Rosebud or they could have turned in any direction.  
The general belief was that they would be somewhere in the middle, not quite 
approaching the Bighorn River, which was Crow territory.62 
 Terrys written order to Custer left the cavalry commander a large degree of 
latitude.  He was to follow the Indian trail that Reno had discovered on the Rosebud.  If it 
turned toward the Little Bighorn, he should still continue southward to the headwaters of 
the Tongue and then towards the Little Bighorn.  All the while, his element should 
continue feeling constantly, to your left, so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of 
the Indians to the south or southeast by passing around your left flank.  Terry expected 
him to be at the mouth of the Little Bighorn by the 26th, yet the order did not place 
Custer on a time line.63  In essence, the order was simply a suggestion for the cavalry 
commander, and Custer realized this when he copied in a letter to his wife the telling 
paragraph of the order: It is of course impossible to give you any definite instructions in 
regard to this movement; and were it not possible to do so, the Department Commander 
places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you 
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precise orders, which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the 
enemy.64   
Custer had free rein to act as he saw fit and the confidence of his commander to 
make the right decision.  Much would depend on his judgment as the situation developed.  
In confirmation, Lieutenant Bradley wrote on the same day in his journal:  . . . it is 
understood that if Custer arrives first he is at liberty to attack once he deems prudent.  We 
have little hope of being in on the death, as Custer will undoubtedly exert himself to the 
utmost to get there first and win all the laurels for himself and his regiment.65   
 Terry, wanting Custer to have every advantage and possibly expecting imminent 
contact, offered him Major James Brisbins battalion from the Second Cavalry, but 
Custer declined.  He felt sure, Edward S. Godfrey, then one of Custers lieutenants, 
later wrote of the flamboyant commander, that the 7th Cavalry could whip any force that 
would be able to combine against it, that if the regiment could not, no other regiment in 
the service could; if they could whip the regiment, they would be able to defeat a much 
larger force, or, in other words, the reinforcement of this battalion could not save us from 
defeat.  Custer also wanted to maintain unit integrity and, of course, as he implied over 
the next few days, would not want the regiment to share its accomplishment with 
another.66  He also declined Terrys proposal that he take along Gibbons Gatling gun 
battery because it would be the only wheeled transportation in the column and slow down 
and limit his movement.  But, he did accept the offer of six of Gibbons Crow scouts 
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under the half-breed Mitch Bouyer, who knew the country where they would travel.67  He 
was sure that he would find the Indians and sure of winning with what he had. 
 At noon on the 22nd, the Seventh Cavalry consisting of thirty-one officers, 566 
enlisted men, thirty-five Indian scouts, and a dozen packers, guides, and other civilians 
began to move.68  The men carried Springfield Model 1873 .45/55 single-shot carbines 
and Colt Model 1873 .45-caliber single-action revolvers with one hundred rounds per 
rifle and twenty-four per pistol.69  There were no sabers present as Custer had ordered his 
men to turn them in a week earlier because of their noisiness and weight.70  Custer, at the 
lead, began his march into immortality.  As the cavalry rode away, scout and interpreter 
Fred Girard overheard General Terry say, Custer is happy now, off with a roving 
command of fifteen days.  I told him not to do as Reno did, but if he thought he could 
whip them to do so.71  Custer until the very end believed he could. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CUSTERS LAST FIGHT 
As Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custers Seventh Cavalry marched away from the 
Yellowstone base camp and into Sioux territory, its officers and men held firm notions 
about how to fight Indians and how the hostiles would react once threatened.  In all, they 
believed that the hardest part of the campaign would involve catching the enemy, not 
defeating him.  Three days later, however, these men would all have a very different 
opinion of Indian warfare. 
In the late afternoon of June 22, Custer halted his column, having marched twelve 
miles.  At sunset, the regimental trumpeter sounded officers call, and the subordinate 
leaders assembled at their commanders bivouac site.  Lieutenant Edward S. Godfrey 
attended the meeting:  
He took particular pains to impress upon the officers his reliance on their 
judgment, discretion, and loyalty.  He thought, judging from the number 
of lodge-fires reported by Reno, that we might meet at least a thousand 
warriors; there might be enough young men from the agencies, visiting 
their hostile friends, to make a total of fifteen hundred.  He had consulted 
the reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the officials in 
Washington as to the probable number of Hostiles (those who had 
persistently refused to live or enroll themselves at the Indian agencies), 
and he was confident, if any reliance was to placed upon these reports, that 
there would not be an opposing force of more than fifteen hundred. 
 
Custer went on to explain his reason for declining Major Brisbins battalion of Second 
Cavalry and Gibbons Gatling guns, emphasizing the importance of a unified command 
and his belief that the Seventh Cavalry alone could accomplish the mission.1 
Neither Custer nor Terry nor the Commission of Indian Affairs had a clear idea of 
the number of Indians that lay ahead.  They had not received any reports from Crook, 
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who could have provided a realistic number.  The assumption was that either column, 
Gibbons or Custers, could alone defeat any hostile force that it might encounter, but no 
one expected that the Indians would stand and fight a pitched battle.  In the officers 
minds, the campaign had come to the point that victory lay only in finding the enemy. 
 At 5:00 a.m. on the 23rd, the column resumed its march, following the Indian trail 
that Reno had earlier discovered, and eight miles later, the unit located the first of a series 
of abandoned Indian camps.  At this site, Custer found a great number of wickiups, bent 
ribs of willow sticks and brush with their bases jammed into the ground and their tops 
drawn together and at one time covered by a blanket or hide.2  Many of the younger 
soldiers and some of the officers assumed that the shelters were doghouses, misled by the 
number of coyote and wolf tracks in the area as these animals scavenged through the left-
over debris of the deserted village.  These temporary lodges, in fact, had quartered 
numerous young men and transient agency Indians.3 
 The command picked up the march again, discovering that the Indian trail 
continued to widen with fresher indications of travel.  Horse droppings, only two days 
old, dotted the drag marks of numerous travois.  Our trail during all movements 
throughout the summer, recalled Wooden Leg, a Northern Cheyenne, could have been 
followed by a blind man.  It was a quarter to a half a mile wide at all places where the 
form of the land allowed that width.4  With this abundance of sign, Custer rightfully 
believed that his command was within thirty miles of the hostile camp.  The column 
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halted for the day at 5:00 p.m., having traveled close to thirty-three miles.5  If Custer 
were correct, he could find the Indians the next afternoon.  
 While Custer puzzled over the profusion of Indian sign, the Sioux camp was 
growing.  Over the span of only six days, since breaking camp after fighting Crook on the 
Rosebud, the village, now situated in the Little Bighorn Valley, had more than doubled 
from 400 to 1,000 lodges, from 3,000 to 7,000 people, and from 500 to over 1,000 
warriors.  The fresh markings of travel that Custer saw came from newly arriving agency 
Indians as they converged on the village in groups of varying sizes.  The Indian camps, 
stretching south to north from Shoulder Blade Creek to Medicine Tail Coulee and on the 
west bank of the river, crowded the valley in six separate tribal circles with the 
Hunkpapas farthest south followed by the Oglallas, Miniconjous, San Arcs, Blackfeet, 
Two Kettles, and Brulés.  Even a few Yanktons and Santees had joined the camp.  At the 
tail and farthest north were bands of Northern Cheyenne and Arapaho.  The Sioux had 
chosen an appealing location to strike camp.  Low grassy hills and benches filled the 
valleys west end, and on the eastern side of the valley, the Little Bighorn River 
meandered through cottonwood thickets in the shadows of a series of steep, ragged 
bluffs, rising at some points to over 300 feet above the river.6  
 On June 24, the Seventh Cavalry marched about twenty-eight miles and again 
passed several large abandoned campsites.  Early that evening the Crow scouts, pushed 
far in advance of the column, returned with promising information on the hostile location.  
They reported that the trail continued but noted that it had turned to the west, following a 
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tributary of the Rosebud toward the Little Bighorn.  Custer now faced a decision.  He 
could continue up the Rosebud to the upper Little Bighorn as Terrys order suggested, but 
the freshness of the Indian trail meant that the village likely lay on the lower portion of 
the river, barely a days march away.  To confirm the Crows findings, Custer sent out 
other scouts: Lonesome Charley Reynolds, Lieutenant Charles A. Varnum, the mixed-
blood Mitch Bouyer, and six Arikara.7  If the reports were true, he had found his quarry 
in less than two days.  He was on their trail and could not leave it. 
Custer called his officers together that night at around 9:30 and relayed what the 
Crows had reported.  Realizing that the trail led over a low mountain pass to the Little 
Bighorn, Custer wanted to start the march at once.  The command would move 
throughout the night and then conceal itself and rest the next day.  During this time, the 
scouts could pinpoint the village, allowing Custer time to study the terrain and develop a 
sound plan for attack on the morning of the 26th, the day that Gibbons column would 
reach the mouth of the river.8   
The command began movement around midnight, marching six miles and then 
halting at 2:00 on a stretch of low ground where they could build small, smokeless fires 
for brewing coffee.  At around 8:00, two Arikara scouts arrived with a message from 
Lieutenant Varnum, the chief of scouts.  At daybreak from a hilltop known by the Crow 
scouts as the Crows Nest, the Indian scouts had spotted smoke rising from the Little 
Bighorn Valley and recognized a moving spot in the distance as the Siouxs enormous 
pony herd.  They insisted that it was the biggest camp and pony herd that any of them had 
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ever seen.  We scouts thought there were too many Indians for Custer to fight, White-
Man-Runs-Him, a Crow scout, recalled. There were camps and camps and camps.9 
 Custer hurried to the Crows Nest to see the village for himself.  Near the butte, 
he met Varnum, who informed him that the Crow scouts had just seen three separate 
groups of Sioux warriors and were concerned that the hostiles had spotted the column and 
would warn the village.  Custer knew he had to react quickly.  By 9:00, he had reached 
the summit, but could not see the village reported by the Indians because the sun had 
risen, leaving a blanket of haze across the valley.  He had no reason, however, to doubt 
that his scouts had seen the objective.  From their description, Custer figured that the 
village lay only twelve to fifteen miles away.10  The Crow scouts, testified the Arikara 
scout Red Star, insisted that the Dakota scouts had already seen the army and would 
report its coming and that they would attack Custers army.  They wanted him to attack at 
once, that day, and capture the horses of the Dakotas and leave them unable to move 
rapidly.11  Their insistence that the command had been discovered weighed heavily on 
Custers next decision. 
During Custers absence, Sergeant William A. Curtis and two men of Troop F had 
ridden back on the columns trail to recover a box of hardtack that had fallen from one of 
the pack mules.  As they approached the site, they discovered several Indians trying to 
pry open the box.  The detachment had fired upon the hostiles but missed.  Sergeant 
Curtis promptly reported the incident to his troop commander, Captain George W. Yates, 
who told Captain Myles W. Keogh, who in turn relayed the information to Captain Tom 
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Custer.  The younger Custer, recognizing the importance of the news, set off to inform 
his brother, reaching him as he left the Crows Nest.12  This report in addition to the 
Crows, forced Custers hand.  His greatest fear seemed close to realization: the Indians 
were going to run before he could fight them. 
At about 11:30, Custer returned to his command and called his officers together.  
Captain Benteen, in his account of the battle, wrote of the meeting:  
General Custer then told us that he had just come down from the 
mountains where our Crow scouts had been during the night, and that they 
had told him they could see teepee tops, lots of Indian ponies, dust, etc., 
but that he had looked through their telescopic glasses and that he could 
not see a thing . . . .13 
 
He had not actually seen the village, but he had to trust his scouts.  The mornings events 
convinced Custer that the soldiers had been discovered, and his experience told him that 
the Indians would not remain in place to allow for an attack the next morning.  He did not 
know the exact location of the village, so he could not formulate a full plan.  But, he had 
to act quickly, so he chose a reconnaissance by force with the entire regiment.  His final 
plan would depend on developing circumstances.14  The size of the village did not 
concern himhis worry was that the village would break up and the Indians flee, 
denying his regiment the fight he sought. 
 By noon, the column had crossed the low mountain pass, commonly referred to as 
the Divide, at the head of Davis Creek and halted on the upper bank of Reno Creek.  At 
this point, Custer called for his adjutant, Lieutenant William W. Cooke, to form the 
regiment into battalions with the purpose of reconnoitering or maneuvering for combat.  
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The splitting of the unit, recalled Lieutenant Winfield S. Edgerly, was to catch them 
[i.e., the Indians] in whatever direction they might flee.15  Three troops, consisting of 
140 officers and enlisted men, would fall under the command of Major Reno.  Captain 
Benteen also took control of three troops, giving him a total of 125 men.  Two troops 
under Captain Yates and three under Captain Keogh, a total of 225 men, remained with 
Custer, making up the third battalion.  Captain Thomas M. McDougall and Troop B 
guarded the packtrain and trailed the command.16 
 Lieutenant Varnum and his Crow scouts had remained at the Crows Nest as the 
command moved forward.  At noon, they rejoined the column and reported observing a 
group of Indians in the part of the village closest to the soldiers break camp and start to 
move downstream away from the unit.  Custer took this as confirmation that the 
command had been discovered and the Indians were beginning to run.17 
 From the top of the Divide, the soldiers could see only a portion of the Little 
Bighorn Valley, but they could now make out the light haze about fifteen miles away that 
the scouts had reported as smoke from the village.  At 12:05 p.m. Custer completed the 
division of his command and within ten minutes gave a verbal order for Benteen to begin 
movement to the left.  Since a ridge obstructed any view to the south, Custer needed 
Benteen to reconnoiter the area to ensure that the Indians were not escaping in that 
direction.18  My orders, testified Benteen during the Reno Court of Inquiry, were to 
proceed out into a line of bluffs about four or five miles away; to pitch into anything I 
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came across and to send word back to Gen. Custer at once if I came across anything.19  
In a letter written to his wife a few days after the battle, Benteen said substantially the 
same thing, adding that he was to move over the immense hills to the left in search of 
the valley which was supposed to be near by.20  Benteens element would serve the 
purpose of early warning against ambush or surprise.  His orders were fairly open, and 
Custer left him to his own discretion if he did not find any Indians.  Benteen could 
continue along his route until he was convinced that there were no Indians in that 
direction and then return to the main trail and the rest of the command.21   
Custer had a valid concern that the Indians might escape to the south.  The 
sightings earlier that morning had correctly placed the village on the lower Little 
Bighorn, but Custer had to know this for certain.  If the hostiles were, in fact, on the 
upper portion of the river valley his attack from the north would drive them south and 
away from Gibbons column.  Likewise, if the camp extended into the upper portion of 
the valley, Indian reinforcements from that direction could jeopardize Custers advance to 
the north, hitting him or Reno in the rear.22   
 The plan to send Benteen to the left also met the intentions of Terrys original 
order to Custer to keep feeling to his left in order to prevent the Indians from escaping 
around his flank to the south and west.  Furthermore, although Custer did not know the 
exact location of the village, he knew that Sioux villages, for sanitary reasons and grazing 
purposes, often consisted of a series of camps spread along a stream.  He did not 
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intentionally mean for Benteen to strike the village from the left, but the possibility of his 
hitting the southern or upper end of the village existedand experience had shown that 
the only way to defeat Indians was to strike from two or more sides at the same time.23   
 As Benteen scouted the south, the remainder of the regiment marched down Reno 
Creek.  Custer and his two battalions moved on the right, while Reno and his battalion 
traveled on the left side.  MacDougalls packtrain brought up the rear, falling 
progressively farther behind.24 
 Meanwhile, Benteens battalion had difficulty moving in the unreconnoitered, 
rough terrain of its designated sector.  Natural obstacles pushed the battalion to the right 
until it was in sight of, and less than a mile from, Custers main trail.  Benteen correctly 
concluded from the ruggedness of the country that no Indians were to the columns left, 
so he moved back toward the main trail, coming out about a mile in front of the 
packtrain.  At this point, he halted his battalion to allow the horses to water in a small, 
spring-fed morass.25 
 Three miles ahead, Custer and Reno stopped at an abandoned village site, where 
the south fork of Reno Creek joined the main branch.  A single teepee remained, 
containing the body of a warrior slain in the fight against Crook a week earlier.  After 
inspecting the lodge, some of the scouts gathered around and set it on fire.  From this 
point, stated scout George Herendeen in an interview with the New York Herald early in 
July, we could see into the Little [Big] Horn valley, and observed heavy clouds of dust 
                                                          
 
23 Stewart, Custers Luck , pp. 319-20. 
24 Utley,  Cavalier in Buckskin, p.183. 
25 Graham, Reno Court of Inquiry, p. 136. 
37 
 
rising five miles distant.  Many thought the Indians were moving away, and I think 
General Custer believed so . . . .26  
 At this time, another officer, Lieutenant R. R. Hare, spotted forty or fifty Indians 
between the lone teepee and the Little Bighorn.  They evidently discovered us, he later 
testified, because they disappeared at once.27  These observations further persuaded 
Custer and his officers that the Indians were fleeing, and the final report from interpreter 
Fred Girard removed any lingering doubt.  From his position on a knoll to the right of the 
lone teepee, he observed the Indian movement and yelled out: Here are your Indians, 
running like devils!28  The warriors spotted by Hare were, in fact, the rear guard of a 
smaller camp of sixty lodges moving forward to join the parent village, and, as this group 
moved, it likely produced part of the dust cloud so clearly visible to Custer and his men.29  
 Custer first ordered the Arikara scouts to pursue the fleeing Sioux, but they 
refused.  If any man of you is not brave, he berated them, I will take away his 
weapons and make a woman of him.  The scouts laughed, but indicated through signs 
that they were ready to fight.  Some would continue ahead with Reno while others moved 
out to capture the Sioux pony herd.30  Custer then ordered Reno forward at a trot while 
his element followed.  Reaching another fork of Reno Creek where the north branch 
joined, the column was within a mile of the Little Bighorn and within two miles of the 
village.  Custer could clearly see the dust cloud from the village, a misperceived 
confirmation of the Indians actions.  Although he had not heard from Benteen, he chose 
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to attack and pressed Reno to cross the river.  Custer sent his adjutant Lieutenant Cooke 
with a message directing Reno to take as rapid a gait as you think prudent and charge 
the village afterward and you will be supported by the whole outfit.31  Although the 
decision to attack seemed abrupt, General Sherman later stated that, in his opinion, 
Custers attack was neither desperate nor rash in view of the circumstances and rules of 
Indian fighting, and that Custer could do nothing but attack when he found himself in 
the presence of Indians.32  As the attack started, Benteen was approximately two to three 
miles behind the column.33   
Reno continued his advance at a gallop toward the river while Custers troops 
watered their mounts in Reno Creek.  Captain Keogh and Lieutenant Cooke accompanied 
the major to the river and were riding back when the interpreter Girard overtook them.  
He said that he and his Crow scouts believed that the Indians were not running away, but 
were moving upstream to fight Reno.  He had alerted Reno, but the officer had continued 
crossing the river.  I knew that Gen. Custer was laboring under the impression that the 
Indians were running away, Girard later testified, and it was important for him to know 
that they were not, but were coming to meet us.34  Scout George Herendeen also recalled 
that a Crow scout called out in Crow that the Sioux were coming up to meet us.35  
The Sioux were coming, but not because they had discovered the column earlier 
that morning.  The Arikara scouts led by Custers favorite guide Bloody Knife had 
moved out in front of Renos column after the commanders rebuke.  Near the fording 
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site that Reno would use, they had fired upon a small group of Indians, killing a young 
boy and perhaps as many as six women.  They soon stopped their pursuit of the Indians 
when a large herd of 200 Sioux ponies came into view.  The scouts then crossed the river 
and were driving the herd away from the village when Sioux warriors starting chasing 
them.36  The hostiles had not known of the regiments position and, as Renos men 
charged down the valley, they reacted the only way they could at that point: they fought.  
A cry was raised that the white soldiers were coming, recalled Gall, a noted Hunkpapa 
war chief, and orders were given for the village to move immediately.  Reno swept 
down so rapidly on the upper end that the Indians were forced to fight.37  Custer had 
surprised them. 
Although Custer would never know, he had established one major tactical 
condition for a successful battle, and those who condemn Custer for attacking a prepared 
village have little to stand on.  The Indians whom Sergeant Curtis, the soldier who 
returned to recover a box of hardtack, saw were not Sioux, but men from Little Wolfs 
band of Cheyenne.  They did not warn the village and reached it only after the fight 
because their chief elected to follow the soldiers and stay out of trouble.38  A few Indians 
may have earlier sighted the column and attempted to warn the village, but most did not 
take their alert seriously.   
When the final alarm rang through the village, many of the Indians did not believe 
it and were unprepared.  I did not think it possible, said Low Dog, an Oglalla warrior, 
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that any white men would attack us, so strong as we were.39  Two Moon, a prominent 
Cheyenne chief, was busy watering his horses when he saw the dust cloud from Renos 
charge.40  Wooden Leg, recovering from a dance the night before, was napping under a 
tree when the attack began.41  Red Horse, a Miniconjou chief, was digging turnips with 
four women when Reno charged.42  Pretty White Buffalo, a Hunkpapa woman, said seven 
Cheyenne had set out for the Spotted Tail Agency that morning and two returned at mid-
day to warn of the column.  As they spread the word, Renos element appeared west of 
the river and began firing into the camp.43  I did not know anything about Renos attack 
until his men were so close that the bullets went through the camp, and everything was in 
confusion.  The horses were so frightened we could not catch them, recalled Iron 
Thunder, a Miniconjou.44  Black Elk, a thirteen-year-old Oglalla boy, was swimming and 
knew nothing of an attack until he heard someone shouting in the Hunkpapa camp: The 
chargers are coming!  They are charging!  The chargers are coming!45  Gall, visiting 
another portion of the village, scurried to his lodge to check on his family and found his 
two wives and three children dead from the bullets of Renos men.46  Sitting Bull, of all 
people, was lying in his teepee recovering from a Sun Dance performance when he 
learned of Renos attack.47   
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If the Indians were not running, why was a dust cloud visible to the soldiers?  The 
Indians observed by Lieutenant Hare were members of a relocating camp, and their 
movement would have caused some of the dust.  Another portion of the explanation 
likely lies with the Indians immense pony herds.  Many Indian accounts, moreover, 
mention a daily moving of large pony herds to better grass and water.  The routine 
activities of a village numbering several thousand people, with at least one pony per 
person, in Montana during a dry summer would alone create a considerable dust cloud.   
 At this point, Custers final plan began to take shape.  If he had intended to follow 
Reno, he now changed his mind.  Reno had not made heavy contact, but reports indicated 
that the Indians were coming to fight him.  To Custer that made sense because he 
expected the warriors to fight a delaying action as far away from the village as possible in 
order to allow women and children a chance to break camp and run.  The fact that 
warriors were separating from the village also created a great tactical opportunity because 
it was far easier to flank an advancing force than a retreating one.  By dashing down the 
river, wrote Custer expert W. A. Graham, he would cut in behind them, and hit them 
from the rear, and he would send for Benteen and put him into action in the center, 
between Reno and himself.48  Tasting victory, Custers soldiers remounted and began 
moving along the bluffs to the north.  In Custers mind, it was Washita all over again.  
 Moving in parallel columns of twos, Custers troops galloped up the steep 
incline.  After traveling about a mile, the command halted, and Custer got his first real 
look at the village.  He viewed the valley with his Crow scouts and orderly trumpeter for 
the day John Martin.  They at first could not see Reno, his element hidden by the timber 
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along the river, but they could see the village.  The encampment was large, and in the 
confusion of battle, it certainly looked like what Custer expected: a fleeing village.  Only 
women and children were visible, tearing down lodges and scurrying about.  Hurrah, 
boys, Custer shouted, turning in his saddle and waving his hat at his men, Weve 
caught them napping!49   
For whatever reason Custer had turned north, he now had to get the remainder of 
the regiment into the fight.  Reno had not charged into the village, but had formed a 
skirmish line, his right flank in a pocket of timber on the river bend and a mere 200 yards 
from the camps southern point.  Custer probably reasoned that the majority of Sioux 
warriors were speeding to repulse this attack.  He was now in position to hit the village 
on its flank, but he had to find a fording site and get Benteen and the packtrain linked 
with rest of the unit immediately.  He needed every soldier and the extra ammunition.50 
 Custer quickly conferred with Cooke and other officers.  As the march resumed, 
Tom Custer rode to his company and instructed Sergeant Daniel Kanipe to ride back to 
Captain MacDougall with orders from the commander.  Tell MacDougall, he said, to 
bring the packtrain straight across the high groundif packs get loose dont stop to fix 
them, cut them off.  Come quick.  Big Indian camp.  As Kanipe departed, Custer 
signaled the element to advance.  Some of the men could not control their horses and 
broke into a gallop past Custer.  Boys, hold your horses, Kanipe heard Custer shout, 
there are plenty of them down there for us all! 51   The command swung to the right and 
down a long, narrow ravine, moving in a single column because of the restricted terrain.  
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After a mile, the ravine opened into a broad coulee known as the Medicine Tail that ran 
toward the river, and Custer supposed it would provide a fording site.52 
 Custer was anxious to get Benteen and his forces into the fight, so he sent another 
courier.  This time he used Trumpeter Martin, a recent immigrant from Italy where he 
was known as Giovanni Martini.  Custer spouted out verbal instructions, but because the 
soldier had yet to master English, Cooke also wrote the instructions for him to give to 
Benteen.  Hastily, he scribbled: Benteen.  Come on.  Big Village.  Be Quick.  Bring 
Packs.  W.W. Cooke. P. bring pacs (sic).53 
Controversy exists over whether Custer ever sent any additional instructions to 
Reno.  One account, related by Private Theodore Goldin, was that Custer sent him to the 
subordinate commander with a written message.  Goldin stated that he did not know the 
contents of the letter and that Reno merely glanced at it and placed it in his shirt pocket.54  
Over the years, some historians have speculated that the message read: Crowd them as 
hard as you can.  We will soon be with you.55  Regardless, Major Reno later denied ever 
having received the message, saying that he had never known of any changes to the plan 
and had expected Custer to back him.  In his official report, written a few days after the 
battle, Reno did not, however, show that he felt his commander had been negligent in 
notifying him of a change in plans: He was fully confident that they [the hostiles] were 
running away, or he would not have turned from me.56  
                                                          
 
 
52 Utley, Cavalier in Buckskin, p. 186. 
53 Graham, Custer Myth, p. 293.  
54 Brady, Indian Fights and Indian Fighters, pp. 270-71. 
55 Quoted in Stewart, Custers Luck, p. 335. 
56 Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1876, p. 479; quoted in ibid., p. 335. 
44 
 
 Custers couriers notified Benteens element, but the reaction was not what Custer 
expected.  Lieutenant Godfrey heard Sergeant Kanipe call out as he passed weve got 
em which led some in Benteens command to surmise that Custer or Reno had taken the 
village.57  Lieutenant Edgerly, likewise, gained the wrong impression from the orders.  I 
heard Trumpeter Martin speak to the orderly behind Capt. Benteen.  He was laughing and 
seemed much elated, Edgerly remembered.  He said it was the biggest village he had 
ever seen and that they had found the Indians asleep in their teepees; that Major Reno 
was charging it and killing everything, men, women, and children.58  Benteen himself 
ignored the urgency.  I asked Martin, after reading the note, about the village, he 
testified in 1879.  He said the Indians were all skedaddling; therefore there was less 
necessity for me to go back for the packs.  I could hear no firing at this time.59 
 Nevertheless, when Martin turned his horse back on the trail and watched Custer 
and the command continue into Medicine Tail Coulee, he was the last white man to see 
the element alive.  Crow scouts, released by Custer because he did not expect them to 
fight, watched from a hill overlooking the ravine.  What actually happened to Custer and 
his portion of the command is a matter of contention.  The only stories that exist are those 
of the Crow scouts and the hostiles, and they are equally confusing. 
The speculation is that Custer again divided his command after sending Martin 
back.  He sent Yates two troops into the coulee toward the river and held Keoghs three 
on a ridge separating the coulee from the next drainage.  Yates would hold the crossing 
site and also present a demonstration to draw pressure from Reno while Keogh protected 
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Benteens approach.  As the command split, Custers youngest brother Boston, who had 
been with the packtrain, arrived, having passed Martin enroute.  He had heard the 
fighting and raced to join his two brothers.  It is likely that he would have informed 
Custer that Benteen had ended his reconnaissance, moved back onto the trail, and linked 
up with the packtrains.  With this information, Custer would now wait for Benteen to 
give him the added force he needed, but, as he did, two developments sealed the 
commands fate.60   
 First, Benteen had not reacted to Kanipes verbal message to MacDougall and 
continued along at a slow trot.  When Martin arrived with the written message, Benteen 
still did not speed up his approach.  At that point, only a gallop would have possibly put 
him into the Custer fight.61  Secondly, Reno did not hold his skirmish line.  After fifteen 
minutes, he withdrew into the woods along the river.  Pressured by the hostiles, he 
ordered a retreat across the river and to the bluffs where Custer had first viewed the river 
valley.  In the retreat, Reno suffered most of his casualties, forty dead and thirteen 
wounded.  The retreat freed numerous Indians to turn and fight the new threat: Custer.  
Lieutenant Godfrey, after interviewing many of the Indians who had fought in the battle, 
wrote: 
The Indians say if Renos position in the valley had been held, they would 
have been compelled to divide their strength for the different attacks, 
which would have caused confusion and apprehension, and prevented the 
concentration of every able-bodied warrior upon the battalion under 
Custer; that at the time of the discovery of Custers advance to attack, the 
chiefs gave orders for the village to move, to break up; that at the time of 
Renos retreat, this order was being carried out, but as soon as Renos 
retreat was assured, the order was countermanded, and the squaws were 
                                                          
60 Utley, Cavalier in Buckskin, pp. 186-87. 
61 Ibid., p. 188. 
46 
 
compelled to return to the pony herds; that the order would not have been 
countermanded had Renos forces remained fighting in the bottom.62 
 
 Benteen, instead of rushing to join Custer, joined Reno on a hilltop where they remained 
for two days. 
 Meanwhile, Custer still waited on Benteens arrival.  From his vantage point on 
East Ridge, he could see Yates element at the Medicine Tail Coulee fording site as well 
as Benteens expected approach.  Yates was holding his position, but the Indian 
resistance was growing as warriors broke from the Reno fight.  Keoghs three troops still 
controlled the ridge separating Medicine Tail Coulee from the next drainage to the north, 
Deep Coulee.63   But where was Benteen?  
As the Indian advance increased, Yates could no longer hold the fording site.  As 
we rushed them the white warriors dismounted to fire, but they did very poor shooting, 
recalled Low Dog.  They held their horses rein on one arm while they were shooting, 
but their horses were so frightened that they pulled the men all around, and a great many 
of their shots went up in the air and did us no harm.64  The demonstration had worked by 
drawing Indians away from Reno, but with that officers retreat and Benteens sluggish 
response, it had worked too well.  Yates fought a deliberate withdrawal northward from 
the mouth of Medicine Tail Coulee, up the slopes of a narrow hill, Butler Ridge, and 
toward a rendezvous point with Custer on the higher Nye-Cartwright Ridge.  The Indians 
were now moving in strength through the vacated coulees, placing enemy to Custers 
south and west. 
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To the east of Yates, Keoghs men held off Galls warriors as they made their way 
up Medicine Tail Coulee, and, although not seriously threatened, he probably realized 
that Yates was in trouble and that the Indians coming through Deep Coulee, to his rear, 
might isolate the two elements from one another.  He began to withdraw northward to 
unite with Yates and the remainder of the command.65  
From Nye-Cartwright, Custer could clearly see the mass of Indians in Deep 
Coulee, where, in time, they could encircle him from the north.  He had to deploy away 
from Deep Coulee to keep the Indians between him and Reno.66  By moving north and 
downstream, Custer continued to draw the majority of Indians after him and away from 
the fording site.  The Indians would fall between him and the expected reinforcements 
from Benteen, thus, in theory, creating a situation for a later combined attack from two 
different directions.  The sight of the great dust cloud moving away from him on the 
opposite bank may have further convinced Custer that the village was running, and he 
would eventually still need to move farther downstream to cut it off after he had defeated 
the foe at hand.67 
 Custer moved his command north and to the west of Deep Coulee and took up a 
position on Calhoun Hill, named for the Troop L commander who fought and died there.  
Keoghs men soon joined, but most were on foot, the Indians having stampeded their 
mounts as the element had formed another dismounted skirmish line while enroute.  The 
meeting place formed the southern end of a high ridge that extends a half mile northward 
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from the river.  The elevation is known as Battle Ridge, and along it and the slopes to the 
east and west, Custers Last Stand took place.68 
 On Calhoun Hill, Keoghs battalion deployed into a blocking position: Calhouns 
L farthest south, Tom Custers C in the middle, and Keoghs I in the north.  Custer and 
Yates element continued looking for a place to maneuver.  Although they had been in 
contact for over an hour, the command had not suffered heavy casualties.  Firing had 
mostly come from a distance, but the halt on Calhoun Hill gave the Indians an 
opportunity to launch their first large-scale attack.  In the face of a charge by mounted 
warriors, Keoghs troops volley-fired and drove them back.69 
 The failed charge and heavy fire of the soldiers forced the Indians to search for an 
alternate means of victory.  Taking advantage of the hills, gullies, rocks, and sagebrush 
clumps, the hostiles realized that they no longer needed to make any charges.  From 
behind concealed positions, they took well-aimed shots with their rifles and fired volleys 
of arrows into the cavalrymen.  Both Sioux and Cheyenne warriors later admitted that 
they inflicted the greatest number of casualties by fighting in this manner.70  Facing a 
concealed enemy and an onslaught of fire, the command still waited for a reinforcement 
that would never come.  
 Each troop made its last stand, but at the northern end of Battle Ridge, now 
known as Custer Hill, the remaining soldiers of Troops E and F and the headquarters 
element fought and died.  About forty of the soldiers killed their horses and used them as 
breastworks, steadily firing from behind them until they ran out of ammunition or 
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suffered a mortal wound.  The fatal blow to the command came from north when Crazy 
Horse, having crossed the river below the village, led a contingent of warriors up Deep 
Ravine, completing the encirclement.71  The annihilation of Custers entire element had 
lasted about two hours.72  All the men were lying on their faces and appeared to have 
been shot in the side, testified Captain MacDougall, whose men held the task of burying 
the dead of Troop E.  I thought they had fought as best they could and were attacked 
from both sides.73 
 Four miles to the south, Captain Thomas B. Weir, hearing the fighting and 
disgusted with Benteens and Renos inaction, rallied his men of Troop D and headed out 
to reinforce Custer.  They only made a short distance, reaching a high hill later named for 
the troop commander, before the Indians spotted their movement and forced them back to 
Reno.  Their charge would have come too late anyway for Custers fight was almost over.  
We saw a good many Indians, recalled Lieutenant Edgerly of his view from Weir 
Point, galloping up and down and firing at objects on the ground. 74 
 The seven remaining cavalry troops continued to hold off the Indians by 
entrenching themselves on Reno Hill.  During the night, they heard the Indians blowing 
bugles taken from Custers dead soldiers.  Occasionally, Benteen and Renos own buglers 
would call back, knowing if they heard a response it was coming from Custers men.  
They never did.75   
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Daylight brought a renewed attack, but the soldiers, although exhausted, held off 
the Sioux and Cheyenne.  By noon, the fighting had tapered off completely.  As the 
soldiers scanned the river valley that evening, they watched the Indians set fire to the 
valleys dry prairie grass and observed through the smoke screen a tremendous 
procession of Indians, ponies, dogs, and travois headed, to their relief, in the opposite 
direction toward the Bighorn Mountains.  Still uncertain of the whereabouts of Custer, 
Benteen and Renos men continued to hold their positions.76  
 On the morning of the 27th, a column of soldiers appeared in the valley, leading 
some of those on Reno Hill to believe it was Custer.  A white scout, Muggins Taylor, 
approached with a note from Terry to Custer, dated June 26, stating that Terry had found 
some of Custers Crow scouts and that they had reported that the column had been 
whipped and nearly all had been killed but that he refused to believe it.  A little while 
later, Lieutenant Bradley arrived with word that he and his scouts had confirmed the 
Crows reports and found 197 bodies.  The news of Custers tragic end shocked the 
survivors and had the same effect on Terry and his staff as they soon arrived in the 
position.77 
The remainder of the command shortly left the hill to see the battlefield and 
discovered, as Lieutenant Godfrey remembered, a scene of sickening ghastly horror.  
The Indians had stripped, scalped, and mutilated the bodies, and the remains now lay 
bloating in the summer sun.  Custer, although naked, was not butchered.  The General 
was not mutilated at all, Godfrey later wrote.  He laid [sic] on his back, his upper arms 
on the ground, the hands folded or so placed as to cross the body above the stomach: his 
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position was natural and one that we had seen hundreds of times while [he was] taking 
cat naps during halts on the march.  One hit was in the front of the left temple, and one in 
the left breast at or near the heart.78     
 On the 28th, the survivors buried Custers slain.  The command had a limited 
number of shovels, so the soldiers could dig only shallow graves using knives and axes to 
chop up the ground.  Although the dead officers received better care, few of the graves 
were deeper than twelve to fourteen inches, and some of the slain received a minimal 
burial, having only their faces covered by dirt.79 
 A more pressing issue of caring for the wounded now faced the commanders.  In 
the early morning of June 29, the column, exhausted and burdened with the injured, 
moved down the Little Bighorn to its mouth at the Yellowstone.  Waiting there was Grant 
Marshs steamboat Far West.  With the wounded aboard, Marsh begin a fifty-four hour 
journey to the Seventh Cavalry Headquarters at Bismarck, Dakota Territory.  Only forty-
four days had passed since Custer and Terry had marched from Fort Abraham Lincoln 
with the band playing Garry Owen.80  
Custer-expert W. A. Graham best summarized the events of June 25, 1876. 
The tactics of the Indians on that day resulted in their doing to Custer 
exactly what Custer had planned to do to them.  And they were able to do 
it because they had the leaders, the arms, and the overwhelming forces, 
none of which facts were known or appreciated by the 7th Cavalry.  Their 
numbers had been underestimated; their leadership and fighting capacity 
undervalued; their superiority in arms not even suspected.  The 7th 
Cavalry paid the penalty for national stupidity.81 
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Custer had expected the Indians and his subordinate leaders to act in a certain way.  His 
experience, perceptions, and expectations had failed him.   
53 
CHAPTER 3 
JUSTIFICATION OF THE ATTACK 
Why would Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer have attacked such a large 
concentration of Sioux and Cheyenne?  How could an experienced commander with the 
perceived best Indian-fighting regiment on the Great Plains have been destroyed by an 
undisciplined, lowly touted band of hostiles?  Some have argued, as General Samuel D. 
Sturgis did shortly after the battle, that Custer was insanely ambitious of glory and had 
made his attack recklessly, earlier by thirty-six hours than he should have, and with his 
men tired out from forced marches.1  Over the years, others, among them Stephen 
Ambrose, Edgar I. Stewart, Fred Dustin, Frederick Van de Water, Earl A. Brininstool, C. 
E. DeLand, and Roger Darling, have echoed that view.  They depict Custer as 
insubordinate, callous, egotistical, and tactically inept, and they underscore the 
overwhelming number of Indians and the villages immensity as proof that Custer acted 
rashly, ignoring common sense and his scouts advice that the Seventh Cavalry could not 
possibly win on that day.   
On the other hand, while fully impossible to know the abstract thoughts that may 
have guided some of Custers actions, it is feasible to study the prior events and tactical 
opinions that would have molded and shaped the officers military mind.  Custer at times 
certainly displayed the aforementioned traits, but understanding what happened at the 
Little Bighorn requires assessment of what Custer saw and expected on the morning of 
June 25, 1876.  Those perceptions and expectations, more than careerism, political 
ambition, vanity, and inexperience, explain his conduct on that fateful day.  In the context 
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of his fifteen years of military experience and that days events, Custer, justifiably 
confident of victory, launched his attack in an authorized and tactically sound manner. 
Custer was popular, precariously involved in politics, but above all, a solid Indian 
fighter.  Allegations about his inexperience fighting the Plains Indians are unfounded.  
Actually, only three other officers, at the time, could rival him in that regard: General 
George S. Crook, General Nelson A. Miles, and Colonel Ranald S. MacKenzie.  The 
former had won his reputation earlier against the Paiutes of Oregon and the Apaches of 
the Southwest, tribes whose fighting styles varied significantly from those of the Sioux 
and Cheyenne.  In his initial efforts on the Great Plains, Crook failed miserably against 
the Sioux at the Rosebud, and, although he would receive credit for capturing Crazy 
Horse in 1877, his most notable fame would come from his failure to bring in Geronimo 
in 1886.  This is not to say that Crook was not a great Indian fighter, but that he was no 
better than Custer.  Miles, at the time of Little Bighorn, had performed only adequately 
during the Red River War of 1874-75 against the Kiowa, Southern Cheyenne, and 
Comanche as had MacKenzie, whose most famous fight came in September 1874 at Palo 
Duro Canyon where he used the same tactics that Custer had employed at the Battle of 
the Washita in 1868 and tried to use at the Little Bighorn.2  With the exception of Crook, 
Custer had more experience fighting Indians than any other commander in the three 
columns that set out in 1876.  He was, in fact, the only one who had faced Sitting Bulls 
Sioux before and won.   
Custers tactics stemmed from his and other officers experiences on the Great 
Plains; no school or field manual existed to guide them on how best to wage Indian 
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warfare.  Although it faced Indian opposition on the Plains for almost fifty years, the 
United States Army never developed a formal set of instructions for battling these 
nomads.  Fighting the Indians was a long-running police action with the armys task 
understood but not exactly defined; hence, Army leaders paid little attention to strategic 
and tactical theory.  Organization and tactics were always directed toward possible wars 
with conventional, European-style military powers, and tactical manuals and West Point 
teaching described this kind of warfare, wrote historian Thomas W. Dunlay.  Indian 
fighting, it was assumed, would soon be a thing of the past; conventional warfare would 
become the armys principal responsibility in the future.3   
Although the War Department did not authorize a manual on Indian fighting, 
officers did recognize a theory in the absence of doctrine.  One portion of the theory was 
the strategic concept of winter warfare.  This time of cold, snow, and ice gave the army 
the best chance of finding the Indians and negated the Indians advantages of mobility, 
their grass-fed ponies being weaker than the cavalrys grain-fed horses, and of evasion, 
since the severe weather locked the hostiles in their camps.  If the village fled under the 
attack, the Army could bring total war by destroying the remaining supplies and 
lodges.  A second concept was that of converging columns from three or more directions 
in an effort to trap the Indians within an area.  Commanders applied this same technique 
at the tactical level by striking an Indian village from two or more directions, effectively 
encircling it and preventing the escape of its inhabitants.  Dawn was the preferred time of 
attack.4  
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With these loose tenets of warfare, officers received wide latitude and operated on 
an almost ad hoc basis, attacking when they deemed necessary.  General Sheridan 
reflected in 1876 on what guidance he could have provided his subordinates.  No 
specific directions, he explained, could be given as no one knew exactly, and no one 
could have known where these Indians were, as they might be here to-day and 
somewhere else to-morrow.5  The Indians thrived on unconventional tactics, often 
employing decoys, ambush, and evasion.  Strategy loses its advantages against an 
enemy who accepts few or none of the conventionalities of civilized warfare, stated 
Edward S. Farrow, a veteran of the Indian Wars.  The Indian is present one day and 
when next heard from is marauding in another state or territory . . . .6 
The one constant that the officers on the Plains recognized was the flight of a 
village after an attack; hence, finding their elusive quarry obsessed officers more than 
fighting them.  The hardest task in Indian warfare was catching the Indians, not 
defeating them once caught, wrote historian Robert Utley.  Given the chance, Indians 
would almost always flee, especially if their families were threatened.  They rarely fought 
unless clearly favored to win, and even then not if casualties seemed likely.  For the 
soldiers, victory, even battle, thus depended on surprise.7  
Custers first experience with Indians confirmed this mindset.  In the spring of 
1867, he commanded the Seventh Cavalry on the expedition led by General Winfield 
Scott Hancock against raiding bands of southern Oglalla Sioux and Southern Cheyenne.  
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To his chagrin, the enemy was far from conventional, difficult to find, capable of 
practically disappearing almost without a trace, prone to mount ambushes, and rarely 
willing to fight unless he dramatically outnumbered the opponent.  It took months before 
Custers first confrontation against Pawnee Killers Oglallas, and the fight was not 
decisive.8  Recalling one of his fruitless pursuits, Custer concluded that the greatest task 
in Indian fighting was locating the prey before he fled. 
So long as they kept united and moved in one body, their trail was as 
plainly to be seen and as easily followed as if made by a heavily laden 
wagon train.  We were not called upon to employ time and great 
watchfulness on the part of our scouts to follow it.  But when it was finally 
clear to be seen that, in the race as it was then being run, the white man 
was sure to win, the proverbial cunning of the red man came to his rescue 
and thwarted the plans of his pursuers.  Again dividing his tribe, as when 
first setting out from the village, into numerous small parties, we were 
discouraged by seeing the broad well-beaten trail suddenly separate into 
hundreds of indistinct routes, leading fan-shape in as many different 
directions.  What was to be done?9 
 
Although aggravated by the difficulties of fighting this type of enemy, Custer was soon to 
experience an extremely successful campaign, one that would establish his reputation on 
the Great Plains and shape the tactics of the military stationed there.  That event was the 
Battle of the Washita. 
This single fight produced a formula that should have ensured military success 
against the Indian tribes of the region.  It called for the effective mobilization of troops 
and a simultaneous attack from multiple directions by units of equal, or nearly equal, 
strength against an unsuspecting village.  The only tactical difference from the Battle of 
the Little Bighorn was that Custer attacked Black Kettles Southern Cheyenne in the 
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winter and before full daylight.  But, the similarities between his and the enemys initial 
actions during that battle and the one eight years later are striking.10 
In November 1868, Custer received explicit orders from Sheridan to move toward 
the Washita River, the supposed winter seat of the hostile tribes: to destroy their villages 
and ponies, to kill or hang all warriors, and bring back all women and children.11  The 
foe he faced was an enormous winter camp containing Kiowas, Comanches, Arapahos, 
Apaches, and Southern Cheyennes.  On November 26, in a snowstorm, Custers Osage 
scouts struck the trail of a raiding party returning from Kansas to villages in Oklahoma.  
The command followed it to the river, arriving at 2:00 a.m., and Custer promptly 
accompanied his scouts forward to view the objective.  The scouts, pointing toward the 
river, reported in broken English, Heaps Injuns down there.  Custer thought he could 
make out the shape of a large body of animals, but he could not see the village.  Only the 
distant tinkling of bells and the bark of a dog convinced him that a village actually 
existed.12   
Although he did not know of the camps exact dimensions or which tribe occupied it, 
he gathered his officers and devised a scheme of attack.  The general plan, Custer later 
wrote, was to employ the hours between then and daylight to completely surround the 
village, and at daybreak, or as soon as it was barely light enough for the purpose, to 
attack the Indians from all sides.13  Custer divided his column into four equal 
detachments.  One group would swing around to the far end of the village, while two 
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others would proceed to the sides.  Custer stayed with the fourth detachment at his 
present location.  Once the detachments were in position, they would wait in place until 
first light, when Custer would give the signal to attack: the regimental band at his side 
opening into Garry Owen.14 
He had made no reconnaissance, held nothing back in reserve, was miles away from 
his wagon train, and had ordered the most complex maneuver in military affairs, a four-
pronged simultaneous attack, wrote Custer critic Stephen Ambrose in an almost 
praiseworthy manner.  It was foolish at best, crazy at worst, but it was magnificent and it 
was pure Custer.15 
The Seventh Cavalry caught the Indians sleeping and within an hour the fight was 
over.  A few warriors fired sporadically from hiding along the banks of the river, but 
there was no organized resistance.  Surveying the village, Custer could see over one 
hundred dead Indians, and his command held some fifty captives and a pony herd of 
almost nine hundred animals.16   
In context of his lack of a full reconnaissance, Custers victory would seem pure 
luck; however, Edward S. Godfrey, as a general some years later, wrote: 
It is a rare occurrence in Indian warfare that gives a commander the 
opportunity to reconnoiter the enemys position in daylight . . . At all 
events his attack must be made with celerity, and generally without other 
knowledge of the numbers of the opposing force than that discovered or 
conjectured while following the trail.  The dispositions for the attack may 
be said to be made in the dark, and successful surprise to depend upon 
luck.  If the advance to the attack be made in daylight it is next to 
impossible that a near approach can be made without discovery.  In all our 
previous experiences, when the immediate presence of the troops was 
once known to them, the warriors swarmed to the attack, and resorted to 
all kinds of ruses to mislead the troops, to delay the advance toward their 
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camp or village while the squaws and children secured what personal 
effects they could, drove off the pony herd, and by flight put themselves 
beyond danger, and then scattering, made successful pursuit next to 
impossible. 17   
 
Custers skill and, to a degree, luck had prevailed. 
The only mishap was the loss of Major Joel Elliots small detachment of nineteen 
men, who, while in pursuit of fleeing Indians, were cut off and destroyed.  Custer sent out 
patrols, but they could not locate any sign of the soldiers.  A large force of Cheyennes 
and Arapahos from villages further downstream had annihilated the detachment, and by 
noon, Kiowas had joined the growing war party.  As Custer organized his soldiers, these 
Indians appeared on the hills surrounding the regiments position.18  They began firing at 
Custers men, which caused him to form the command into a defensive perimeter.  Custer 
considered continuing the offensive, but wisely concluded that he would have faced a 
static and numerically superior enemy without the benefit of surprise.  To guide my 
command safely out of the difficulties which seemed just then to beset them, Custer 
wrote, I again had recourse to that maxim in war which teaches a commander to do that 
which his enemy neither expects nor desires him to do.19  He first ordered his men to 
destroy the pony herd and burn the lodges and their contents, preventing the future use of 
the villages extensive winter supplies by the survivors or any other Indians for that 
matter.  To relieve pressure on the command and create an opening for retreat, he chose 
an audacious move.  Forming into columns, Custer marched the Seventh Cavalry 
downstream toward the Kiowa, Arapaho, and other villages.  He hoped the warriors 
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would return to their villages to defend them, which would allow him to change direction 
and ride back to his wagon train.  They did just that without attacking or pursuing him.20 
Although he violated a seemingly fundamental military precept by attacking an 
enemy of unknown strength on a battlefield of unknown terrain, Custer had decisively 
destroyed a large village.  A prudent commander would have conducted a thorough 
reconnaissance of the village and its proximity before fielding the offensive.  But Custer 
had learned, or perhaps sensed, that the rules of conventional war did not always apply 
when fighting Indians.  Robert Utley best summarized Custers actions and perceptions 
on that day. 
Custer did not allow prudence to jeopardize surprise.  A reconnaissance of 
Black Kettles village and its surroundings, especially one wide-ranging 
enough to have uncovered the downstream villages, would have risked 
discovery and flight before Custers companies had reached their assigned 
attack positions.  Better to risk uncertainties of terrain and enemy strength 
than premature discovery.  In Indian warfare, moreover, such uncertainties 
did not entail as serious risks as in conventional war. Psychological factors 
figured more importantly and usually outweighed disparity of numbers.  If 
surprise could be achieved, demoralized flight could be expected no 
matter what the odds, especially if women and children were present.  
Also, Indians fought as individuals, each pursuing his own aims and 
instincts, not as organized, disciplined bodies obedient to the orders of a 
leader.  Because of this style of combat, small but disciplined teams of 
mediocre soldiers could hope, in favorable circumstances, to overwhelm 
large but undisciplined masses of individually superior Indian warriors.21 
 
Custer had, in fact, outnumbered the warriors present in Black Kettles camp, but the 
overall encampment of Indians was larger than the one he would attack almost eight 
years later.  Custer judged the length of the entire complex at twelve miles while De 
Benneville Randolph Keim, a war correspondent for the New York Herald, investigated 
the site after the fight and estimated that the signs of Indian villages stretched for six or 
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seven miles along the river.22  Custer had wisely chosen not to continue the fight because 
he knew there were too many Indians for him to defeat.  
Custers other contacts with Indians reinforced his tactics and opinion of their 
fighting skills.  During the Yellowstone Expedition of 1873, Custer spent more time 
during the initial weeks of the campaign hunting the regions plentiful game than 
confronting the numerous Indians he expected to encounter.  Eventually on August 4, a 
small band of warriors charged into the troopers camp, trying to stampede the cavalrys 
horses.  The unit quickly came alert, repulsing the attempted theft with volley fires.  
Custer and twenty soldiers pursued the fleeing war party for two miles before they met an 
immense number of mounted warriors.  Custer, now reinforced by a full troop, 
dismounted his small detachment and held off over 300 Sioux for more than three hours.  
Recognizing that the Indians had grown weary of their failed attempts to dislodge his 
command, Custer decided to take the offensive and drive them back.  No sooner did the 
Indians discern our intentions, Custer wrote in his official report of the engagements 
during the expedition, than, despite their superiority in numbers, they cowardly prepared 
for flight, in which preparation they were greatly hastened when Captain Moylans 
squadron charged them and drove them pell-mell for three miles.23   
 On August 8, Custers scouts discovered the trail of a large village leading to the 
Yellowstone.  Custers trusted Arikara guide Bloody Knife estimated that the village 
contained between 400 and 500 lodges.  If so, it harbored most of Sitting Bulls followers 
and held as many as 1,000 warriors.  Custer promptly set forth to attack it that evening.  
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Marching throughout the night and following day, Custer discovered an abandoned 
village site just before dark, locating immense quantities of Indian equipment strewn 
along its withdrawal route.  To his disgust, Custer found that the hostiles had crossed to 
the other side of the river.  Anxious to continue the pursuit, Custer and his men spent the 
next day futilely attempting to cross the same water.   
At dawn on the 11th, the Sioux appeared in strength on the opposite bank of the 
Yellowstone and, to the amazement of the soldiers, began crossing the river below and 
above the command.  Custer reacted swiftly, dispatching detachments to thwart the 
Indians moves.  Several cavalry charges repelled the attacking hostiles, eventually 
forcing them back across the river after nearly nine miles of chase.  Custers 450 
cavalrymen had fought an estimated 800 to 1,000 warriors, losing only four men while 
inflicting over forty casualties.24 
Again Custer had been heavily outnumbered and won.  His confidence in his own 
and his mens ability against the Sioux grew.  His one failure to this point had been to 
ignore a significant difference between the new adversary and the ones he had faced in 
Kansas and Oklahoma.  These Sioux had shown tremendous tenacity, and although they 
had eventually retreated in the face of cavalry charges, they had proven more daring than 
others.  Likewise, an entire village had readily crossed a river that Custers men could not 
ford.  Custer, however, did notice that they were well-dressed and well-armed, 
documenting this in his official report.  
Many of the warriors engaged in the fight on both days were dressed in 
complete suits of the clothes issued at the agencies to Indians.  The arms 
with which they fought us (several of which were captured in the fight) 
were of the latest improved patterns of breech-loading repeating rifles, and 
their supply of metallic rifle-cartridges seemed unlimited, as they were 
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anything but sparing in their use.  So amply have they been supplied with 
breech-loading rifles and ammunition that neither bows nor arrows were 
employed against us.25  
 
To many this would seem an omen of things to come; however, Custer saw it more as 
proof that the Sioux, regardless of numbers and arms, could not defeat his Seventh 
Cavalry. 
During the Black Hills Expedition of 1874, the lack of war-like activity by the 
Sioux reinforced Custers opinion of them.  The first sighting of Indians came when the 
column saw a small band of twenty or so braves not far away.  They scampered as soon 
as observed, Custer subsequently wrote.  Later, after viewing smoke signals on the 
surrounding hills, he consulted his scouts, who told him that the signals may be intended 
to let the village know where we are, so that they may keep out of our way . . . .26   
As the time of the Great Sioux War of 1876 neared, Custer had experienced 
enough Indian fighting to mold his tactics and philosophy.  He, like the majority of 
officers on the Plains, had firm notions about how to fight Indians and how they would 
react.  He was not particularly concerned with the size of a hostile force in a village 
because he assumed, based on general experience, that the Indians would flee.  Thus 
everyone worried not about how to defeat the Indians, noted historian Utley, but how to 
catch them before they discovered the soldiers and fled in all directions.27  Custers 
fellow commanders in the Dakota column shared the same perception.  Colonel Gibbon, 
writing about his experiences during the Great Sioux War, stated that the object of 
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General Terrys plan in June 1876 had been to prevent the escape of the Indians, which 
was the idea pervading the minds of us all.28 
With this mindset among the officers of the column, it would be absurd to insist 
that Custer disobeyed Terrys orders by attacking the village too soon.  Terry planned to 
march up the Bighorn with Gibbons infantry and reach the mouth of the Little Bighorn 
on June 26.  Custer would move up the Rosebud, locate the Indian trail that Reno had 
found, and follow it, allowing him to meet the hostiles from the opposite direction.  
Terrys instructions for Custer to constantly search his southern flank placed further 
emphasis on this obsession to prevent the escape of the Indians.  The orders were 
completely discretionary and could not have been otherwise because of the uncertainty of 
the Indians location.  The most damning portion of the orders for any argument that 
Custer disobeyed them lies in the first paragraph. 
It is of course impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to 
this movement; and were it not possible to do so, the Department 
Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability 
to wish to impose upon you precise orders, which might hamper your 
action when nearly in contact with the enemy.  He will, however, indicate 
to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that 
you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for 
departing from them.29 
 
Although for years discarded as fictitious, historians now accept that Custers 
black cook Mary Adams accompanied the expedition and trust the 1878 affidavit she 
produced in regards to Terrys orders to Custer.  Her affidavit, as the written order does, 
negates any opinion that Custer was in the wrong for attacking.  After the conference 
aboard the Far West, Terry came to Custers tent, and Adams overheard part of their 
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conversation.  Custer, said Terry, I dont know what to say for the last.  Custer 
replied, Say whatever you want to say.  Terry then said, Use your judgment and do 
what you think best if you strike the trail. And whatever you do, Custer, hold on to your 
wounded.30  It seems likely, in view of this truncated dialogue, that Custer had asked if 
he should attack if he found the village. 
By the time of the Battle of the Little Bighorn, Custer had developed a proven 
tactic for defeating Indians, held a logical perception of their reaction to threat, gained 
authorization to attack the hostile village, believed the Indians had discovered his 
column, and was convinced that his foe was fleeing.  He chose to pursue them and attack 
with a tactically sound configuration of his command.  The common criticism that he 
violated a basic principle of war by dividing his command in the face of the enemy seems 
unwarranted.  From what he could see and hear on that fateful day, the Indians were 
reacting as anticipated: they were running away.  He expected the warriors to fight a 
rearguard action, but if he acted quickly, he might still be able to cut off the villages 
withdrawal, surround it, and assault from multiple directions.  Custers driving thought 
was to prevent the village from scattering and breaking up, and that he could do only by 
dividing his command into elements of a reconnaissance by force.  The division of the 
command was not in itself faulty, stated Godfrey.  The same tactics were applied at the 
battle of Washita and were successful.31 
 The multi-pronged attack had worked before, but was it a rational tactic?  In the 
context of the principles of war, it would appear to have been so.  Current United States 
principles of war contain the following facets: objective, offensive, mass, maneuver, 
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economy of force, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity.  They are not 
substitutes for sound, rational thinking and tend to be more descriptive than dogmatic.  
They can appear somewhat redundant and may conflict with one another under certain 
conditions; nevertheless, the principles of war provide the essential components of a 
successful operation.32  
The definition of objective states that a commander should direct every military 
operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.33  Custers main 
objective was to find the Sioux village and destroy it.  If he could not achieve this, he 
could at least minimize the Indians flight and kill as many warriors as he could.  A 
defeat of the large hostile village would most likely prove decisive in the war against the 
Sioux.  Was that objective attainable?  Based on his experiences, Custer believed that it 
was.  
The term offensive refers to military actions that seize, retain, and exploit the 
initiative.  The offensive permits the commander to exercise initiative and impose his 
will on the enemy, to set the terms and select the place of battle, to exploit enemy 
weaknesses and rapidly changing situations, and to react to unexpected developments.  
Even when an offensive turns to a defense, a commander must still seek ways to gain the 
initiative and turn the battle.34  Given the circumstances on June 25, Custer had three 
choices: he could retreat, hunker down and allow the village to escape while possibly 
subjecting his command to an Indian assault, or he could attack.  His understanding of 
Indian behavior led him to believe that they would run when they discovered him, not 
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attack him, and there seemed to be no good reason to retreat.  Believing the Indians had 
discovered the regiment, Custer stayed with the offensive to stop their perceived flight 
and hopefully obtain a decisive victory.  
Mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and 
time.35  The proper execution of this principle, in conjunction with other principles of 
war, may permit numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive combat superiority at 
the point of decision.36  Although Custer split his forces, he still maintained mass.  
Critics who charge Custer with having committed a grave tactical blunder miss that 
essential point.  Mass is the massing of effects rather than the concentrating of forces.  
Custer did, in fact, consolidate the bulk of his combat power, five troops, under his 
immediate command.  This element was the main effort, and Custer attempted to mass its 
effects at the decisive time and place: the enemys flank or rear as Reno charged the 
southern end of the camp.  Had he kept his forces together in a flawed conception of the 
principle, he would have turned the fight into a frontal attack that, in any circumstances, 
would have still allowed the majority of the village to escape.  
Maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the 
flexible application of combat power.37  Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off 
balance by making them confront new problems and new dangers faster than they can 
deal with them.38  Custer attempted to accomplish this by attacking from two directions.  
Renos element would serve as a fixing force, directing and holding the Indians attention 
toward the southern end of the village.  Before they could effectively respond to this 
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threat, Custer would strike them on the flank, forcing the enemy to deal with a second, 
unexpected danger.  In relation to modern tactics, Custers plan was a variant of a 
movement to contact with the purpose of finding, fixing, and finishing the enemy.  
Because Custer did not know the exact location and size of the enemy when he split his 
forces, the attack on the village was a hasty attack, which is a quickly planned 
operation without pause in the forward momentum of the force upon initial contact with 
the enemy.39   
Inside this hasty attack, Custers multi-pronged approach was an attempted 
envelopment.  This form of maneuver requires a holding attack to fix the enemy and a 
maneuver force, which passes around one of the enemys flanks and strikes him there or 
in the rear.  The key portion of this maneuver is that the assault element must find or 
create an assailable flank.  The danger of an envelopment, however, is that the flanking 
force and holding force typically lie beyond the distance of mutual support; hence, a 
determined enemy can defeat the attackers in detail if one of the forces fails to achieve its 
task and purpose.40   That, in fact, was what happened when Reno failed to hold his 
position, and Custer, without reinforcements from Benteen, experienced difficulties in 
quickly reaching an assailable flank. 
Economy of force dictates that commanders employ all combat power available 
in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to 
secondary efforts.41  Benteen and Reno each controlled three troops in supporting roles 
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while Captain MacDougalls troop provided security for the packtrain.  Custer, as the 
main effort, led five troops.  In doing so, he fairly distributed his fighting force.  
Unity of command means that all forces work under one responsible commander.  
The goal is to achieve a unity of effort with all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose.42  
Custer was the single commander; however, the actions of his subordinate commanders 
resulted in a collapse in the unity of effort.  Reno failed to hold his position and retreated 
across the river, and Benteen went even further by not responding to Custers order to 
join him quickly in the attack.  Instead of a unified effort, Custer and his five troops were 
left to fight alonea turn of events not brought about by Custers actions.  
The definition of security states that a unit must never permit the enemy to 
acquire unexpected advantage.43  Custer, for the most part, implemented the correct 
procedures to prevent the Indians from discovering his command or its purpose.  The unit 
posted pickets, moved at night, placed scouts forward, and used small, concealed 
campfires during hours of limited visibility.  The contact with Indians on the morning of 
June 25 was a chance meeting and carried no weight on the battle except to convince 
Custer that the command had been discovered.  His camp remained safe from harassment 
and discovery during the campaign.  
Surprise calls for a commander to strike the enemy at a time or place or in a 
manner for which he is unprepared.  During such an action, it is not essential that the 
attack catch the enemy completely unaware but only that he becomes aware too late to 
react effectively.  Surprise can come from the attackers tempo, size of force, direction 
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or location of the main effort, and timing.44  Custer thought he had lost this principle, 
but by all Indian accounts, he achieved it.  The attack failed primarily because of the 
Indians ability to react effectively, a factor compounded by Renos failed charge.  The 
Indians were not prepared for an attack, but they possessed enough warriors to hold Reno 
and convince him to retreat.  At that point, regardless of how surprised they were, they 
had the numbers to turn Custers charge and surround him in the absence of Benteens 
column. 
Simplicity calls for clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to insure 
thorough understanding.45  Custer did not have time to waste; thus, his plan would fall in 
place as the situation developed.  His orders to Reno and Benteen could not have been 
more detailed because, although he knew the enemy was ahead, Custer could not give 
exact directives without seeing the enemy and the terrain.  In turn, he placed faith in the 
abilities of his subordinate commander to react to the unfolding situation.  He probably 
expected a simple attack since he believed that the Indians were running and would react 
as they usually did.  Custer did give one clear, concise, and important order, but Benteen 
failed to react to it in a prompt manner.  
Custer did not violate the principles of war in his actions or planning, but he could 
not achieve them because of the failures of his subordinate commanders.  Likewise, his 
tactics, up to the point that he sent Reno across the river and then moved his element to 
the bluffs, were sensible.  Only one remaining factor would condemn Custers actions at 
the Little Bighorn as rash, driven by conceit, and tactically inept: his choice to attack a 
village that was too big for his Seventh Cavalry to take.  Custer had known that he faced 
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too many Indians and too large a village to continue an offensive down the Washita in 
1868.  Could he, eight years later, have used bad judgment and ignored common sense? 
Estimates of the Little Bighorn villages size and numbers have varied over the 
years.  The first surfaced during Renos Court of Inquiry in 1879, giving the village and 
its inhabitants, for the most part, exaggerated spatial dimensions and numbers.  
Judgments of Army officers to the length of the encampment ranged from two and a half 
to over four miles, while the width may have been between 200 yards and one-half mile.  
Inside this area, some witnesses estimated as many as 1,800 teepees and 500 wickiups 
while others concluded that the actual count was 1,200 teepees and 400 wickiups.  The 
number of warriors, according to such testimony, might have been 3,000or three times 
that many.46   
One possible explanation for this was that the survivors of the fight increased the 
size and numbers to create a perception that little could have been done to save Custer 
and his direct command and to clear themselves of responsibility for the disaster.  The 
survivors may also have been reluctant to explain the disaster without giving the enemy 
an unfair advantage, hence, placing Custer and his detachment in the same situation with 
Roland at Roncesvalles, Crockett and Bowie at the Alamo, and Gordon at Khartoum.  
Many historians have stayed with these numbers and dimensions with some even 
increasing them to support their theses on the battle.   
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Indian accounts of the villages dimensions varied from one to six miles in length 
and from one-third to a full mile in width.47  As for the totals of village inhabitants and 
lodges, most Indian testimonies fail to cite numerical estimates.  White-Man-Runs-Him, a 
Crow scout, stated that the village was the biggest Indian camp I have ever seen,48 
while the Blackfeet Sioux Chief Kill Eagle testified that the camps lodges were just as 
thick as they could be put up.49  Unlike the soldiers, the Indians had an excuse for 
disparity and inexactness because of their cultural unfamiliarity with the white mans 
distance, time, and numbers.  During an interview with Sitting Bull in late 1877, an 
inspector from the North West Mounted Police, James M. Walsh, blatantly told the 
correspondent not to count on accuracy in Sitting Bulls or any other Indians statement 
in regard to time or numbers.50  Of more significance is the hostile remembrance of the 
villages terrain boundaries.   
In interviews, almost a dozen Indians uniformly sketched out the dimensions of 
the village, placing each separate camp circle in proximity with terrain features.  Of 
these, the best Indian account of the true dimensions is that of Wooden Leg.  As a 
Northern Cheyenne, his village lay at the tail of encampment.  He stated that the 
Cheyenne camp was just downstream and to the west of Medicine Tail Coulee.  On the 
other end of the camp were the Hunkpapas, lying near Shoulder Blade Creek and just 
northeast of present-day Garryowen, Montana, with the remaining camps between 
them.51  Accounts from Renos men also placed the Hunkpapas teepees here. 
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 Historian Greg F. Michno used these boundaries to structure the village 
mathematically, which significantly reduced its perceived size.  Using these confines, the 
camp was only one and one-half mile in length, an area containing approximately 877 
acres.  Researching the configuration of camps, he found that, when located near water, 
they conformed to the course of the stream.  His scrutiny of pictures of Indian villages 
revealed that inhabitants clustered their lodges at certain points for reasons of security, 
geography, and family ties, with the typical cluster containing between twelve and twenty 
tepees per acre.  The normal family teepee held five people and ranged in width from 
eighteen to twenty-two feet, covering a space of almost forty-eight square yards.  With an 
acre containing 4,840 square yards, one hundred teepees could fit inside the area, but 
such a concentration would have been ridiculous.52    
Soldiers estimates of the village ranged from 1,200 to 1,800 lodges and from two 
and a half to almost four miles in length with a width ranging from 200 yards to a half 
mile in some places.  To place 1,800 teepees in an area more than two miles long and a 
quarter-mile wide (roughly 440 yards) would require only five teepees per acre, and to 
place 1,200 in that area would require only three per acre.  Any fewer teepees per acre 
would not have constituted a village, and Custer more than likely would have continued 
searching for the great camp that he knew existed somewhere.  Kill Eagle said the teepees 
were just as thick as they could be put up, and there is no reason to believe that this 
camp was uncommonly spread out.  The camp ran one and one-half miles along the 
river and three hundred yards back from it, Michno wrote.  The area covered by the 
main bulk of the village on 25 June amounted to only one-quarter square mile.53  As to 
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the number of warriors inside this condensed village, historian Edgar I. Stewart offers the 
best suggestion.  While most of the teepees were undoubtedly family, rather than war, 
lodges, he concluded, the number of wickiups was unusually large, and these were 
occupied almost exclusively by fighting men.54  This reasoning would give an added 
deception to Custer or anyone viewing the village as to the true numbers inside.   
 In appearance, this was a large village, but not as large as the one on the Washita 
and not much larger than the Sitting Bull camp that Custer had attempted to attack in 
1873.  Sitting Bulls Hunkpapa on the Little Bighorn would have been in the same 
position as Black Kettles Southern Cheyenne.  At the Washita, Custer had hit the 
Cheyenne village and feinted toward the rest because he knew that a series of camps 
covering at least six miles were too much to attack.  However, a camp consolidated along 
a stretch of one and one-half miles was well within Custers ability to defeat.  The true 
logic of the matter is that Custer was outnumbered by Indians who were not going to run, 
but the village did not look to contain that many.  When he crested the bluffs and called 
for Benteen, he was looking at a village that he believed he could take; thus, instead of 
retreating or reinforcing Reno, he prepared to envelope the entire complex.   
In this final fight, Custer along with his two brothers, Tom and Boston, a brother-in-
law Captain James Calhoun, a nephew Autie Reed, and numerous men, who had loyally 
served with the Boy General since the Civil War, fought to their deaths on a hill later 
named after him.  He had led them there, misguided by experience and perceptions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
IN RETROSPECT 
If Custer was justified in his actions and his choice to attack the village, what 
decisions and events led to the destruction of his five troops?  Could the outcome have 
been altered or was Custers defeat set in stone from the beginning? 
Custers decisions before the regiment departed from the Yellowstone base camp 
on June 22 provide part of the answer.  He first declined the attachment of Major 
Brisbins battalion and then refused the added firepower of Colonel Gibbons Gatling 
guns.  Custer rejected the additional soldiers, as he later explained to his officers, because 
he was confident that the 7th Cavalry could whip any force that would be able to 
combine against it.1  The addition of over one hundred soldiers, however, would have 
strengthened Reno and possibly permitted his force to overpower the Indians initial 
stand or it might have proven to be the combat power needed to break through the 
resistance at Medicine Tail Coulee and charge into the flank or rear of the camp.  The 
question of troop strengthor firepowerunderlies the common argument that Custer 
could have accomplished his mission by keeping his forces together.  Had he not sent 
Benteen on a reconnaissance mission to the left, these troops could have served in the 
same capacity as Brisbins proposed battalion.  Custers decision to send Benteen to the 
left, however, was valid.    
The presence of a Gatling gun battery definitely would have changed the outcome 
of the fight.  If attached to Renos column, the guns likely would have destroyed the bulk 
of warriors on the valley floor and left Custer with little opposition as he charged down 
                                                          
 
1 W. A. Graham, The Custer Myth: A Source Book of Custeriana, p. 134. 
77 
Medicine Tail Coulee or even further downstream.  But, the Battle of the Little Bighorn 
would not have taken place at its time or location had Custer chosen to drag the battery 
along.  Four condemned horses hauled the weapon systems, and they could not have kept 
up with the column during long, fast marches, nor could they have crossed rough ground 
without help.  Had Custer chosen to slow his columns pace to match that of the battery, 
he would not have reached the battlefield on June 25.2  The benefit would have been that 
a fight at a later time would have probably involved Gibbons force as it approached from 
the opposite end of the river valley.  Nonetheless, Custers choice not to take the weapon 
system reflected rational thinking.  Invented in 1861 and with few improvements since its 
initial production, the guns frequently malfunctioned and stood so high that their firers 
were easy targets for the enemy.3  As proof of the unsuitability of the Gatlings for the 
rough terrain of the region, Gibbon, with some in tow, experienced numerous problems 
as the weary horses fell back from his own slow-moving main body, which, unlike 
Custers, contained foot soldiers.  His column spent hours retrieving the Gatlings and, at 
times, had to lower the cumbersome firearms down steep hills by hand and rope.4  A 
reversal of Custers earlier decisions thus possibly could have changed the face of the 
battle or caused it to occur at a different time and place under more favorable conditions.  
But, what really went wrong at the Little Bighorn stemmed from the decision to attack on 
June 25, a decision based on the belief that the hostiles had discovered the column.   
What could have happened if Custer stuck with his original plan to attack on the 
morning of the 26th?  A delay in the attack would have given him time to conduct a 
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proper reconnaissance.  If the Indians remained in position, his reconnaissance would 
have revealed that no reason existed for sending Benteen to the left, which would have 
given added combat power to his other elements if he chose the same direction of attack.  
The reconnaissance might have convinced him also that the village, in fact, contained too 
many Indians for him to defeat.  He could have then dispatched a messenger to Terry and 
Gibbon, proposing a coordinated advance on the morning of June 26.  The operation 
might still have been a surprise, but it is more likely that the Indians encountered on the 
morning of the 25th would have eventually alerted the whole village by that afternoon.  
Thus, Custer then would have faced either an attack by the hostiles or watched as they 
broke camp and fled in the opposite direction. 
In a perfect scenario, the Indians would have remained unaware of Custers 
presence, and his messenger would have reached Terry and Gibbon on the evening of 
June 25.  Gibbon would have continued his march from the opposite direction, but at a 
quickened pace, leaving the Gatlings behind.  He then would have dispatched Brisbins 
cavalry forward, providing another prong of attack and blocking the withdrawal route of 
the Indians.  At dawn on the 26th, Custers regiment would have struck the southern and 
eastern portion of the village while Brisbin stormed the northern.  The fighting still would 
have been intense, but as the afternoon approached, Gibbons infantry would have 
appeared from the north, sealing the Indians fate. 
This, of course, is all speculation, so the real hope of a Seventh Cavalry victory at 
the Little Bighorn lies in the actual circumstances and decisions made by Custer and his 
subordinate commanders during the attack.  Four specific events were critical: Custers 
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move to the bluffs, Renos failure to charge, Renos withdrawal, and Benteens slow 
reaction to Custers orders.   
After Reno departed, Custer moved to the right to strengthen the reconnaissance 
and hit the Indians from a different direction.  Had he held at the river and reinforced 
Reno, the cavalry might have broken through the Indians initial resistance and charged 
into the Hunkpapa camp or formed a strong skirmish line in the timber where Reno 
actually held for a while.  Custer then would have needed Benteen to execute a flanking 
movement to bring success.  During the actual fight, however, Benteen took over an hour 
to reach Renos defensive position on the opposite side of the river, and he would have 
arrived too late to deliver a decisive blow.  A portion of the village would have fallen to 
Custer, but the Indians would have faced resistance on only one front.  As their warriors 
held off the cavalry, the remaining inhabitants would have broken camp and scattered.  
The only way for Custer to defeat the entire village was to surround it, and that could 
only come by a second attack from the bluffs overlooking the river.  
Renos forming of a skirmish line and subsequent failure to hold it freed 
numerous Indians to concentrate on Custer.  Had he continued to fight in the valley, there 
would not have been as much pressure on his commander, and Custer might have been 
able to maneuver into a decisive location to cross the river and hit the flank or rear of the 
village.  Moreover, had Reno remained in the valley, Benteen likely would have moved 
to Custer instead of halting, and the two elements together could have executed an 
effective charge against the village.   
Renos decision to abandon his position outside the village met mixed views by 
both his soldiers and opponents.  Indian accounts cite Renos failed actions as the 
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decisive piece to their victory.  He had not suffered heavy casualties and was within 200 
yards of the Hunkpapa camp when he chose to withdraw his command.  The disorganized 
flight from the valley cost him heavy casualties and released Galls warriors to follow 
Custer and hit the flank held by Calhoun and Keogh, providing one side of the Indians 
encirclement.  The retreat also boosted the morale of the Indians. 
When Benteen moved back to the main trail after his reconnaissance, he was only 
thirty minutes behind the rest of the command.  His pace continued to slacken, and when 
he received Martins message from Custer, he did little to speed up his movement.  
Custer had expected him to move swiftly and had positioned companies to protect his 
advance.  Had Benteen moved at a gallop he could have met Custer at Medicine Tail 
Coulee within fifteen minutes.  He would have then served as a diversion that would have 
allowed Custer a chance to extricate his column, or he could have possibly been the 
decisive factor in victory because the Indians moving up the coulee would have been 
caught between his forces and Custers.  On the other hand, he and his men might have 
died as Custers did, but that would not have been likely.  Reno was equally as guilty of 
not responding to Custers order to Benteen because he knew of it and did nothing.  Only 
one commander, Captain Weir, after ignoring Renos order not to leave the position, took 
his company to reinforce Custer, but by the time he departed, most of Custers men were 
dead and the Indians, now turning their attention again to Reno, forced the company back 
to the hill.  In theory, then, the officers of the Seventh Cavalry officers could have altered 
the battles events.  They might not have brought absolute success, but the fight could 
have certainly gone differently.  
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To prove that Custer could have achieved a decisive victory is impossible, but one 
conclusion stands clear: he does not deserve the criticism directed at him by many 
historians for his actions at the Little Bighorn.  Given his prior experiences, the 
information and perceptions that he had at every decisional juncture, and the actions he 
expected from his subordinate commanders, it is difficult to determine what he should 
have done differently.  The Indians were strong that day, and they did not act in the 
manner that Custer, or many other officers, expected.  In all, Custer died because of 
peculiar circumstances rather than poor judgment and tactics.  Perhaps, the telling 
circumstance for Custer and his men was that these Indians were confident.  They were 
aware of their strength in numbers, trusted their leaders, and had proven just a week 
earlier that they could stand and defeat the white mans cavalry.  Custer attacked them, 
believing he could win.  All of his prior experiences pointed to certain victory, and 
therein lay the main reason for his tragic end. 
 Custer loved war and the rewards he reaped from being good at leading men in 
combat.  In years long numbered with the past, when I was merging upon manhood my 
every thought was ambitiousnot to be wealthy, not to be learned, but to be great, he 
noted in 1867.  I desired to link my name with acts and men, and in such a manner as to 
be a mark of honor, not only to the present but to future generations.5  He was not a 
perfect officer nor was he the best Indian fighter ever on the Plains, but on that summer 
day in 1876, he made a sound military decision.  In doing so, he tragically fulfilled his 
lifelong ambition. 
                                                          
5 Quoted in Robert M. Utley, Cavalier in Buckskin: George Armstrong Custer and the Western Military 
Experience, pp. 211-12. 
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